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Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents evaluations of three pre-ACA policies resembling ACA 
reforms.   In the first essay, “Entrepreneurship and job lock: the interaction between tax subsidies 
and health insurance regulations,” I use variation across states and over time in state-level health 
insurance regulations and health insurance tax subsidies to show that the effect of a tax subsidy 
similar to the ACA’s tax credits depends on the type on regulations that affect underwriting.  I 
show that people with pre-existing conditions do not respond to tax subsidies in places where 
they cannot buy health insurance, but that they respond disproportionately in places where they 
can buy risk-rated health insurance.  Most importantly for the ACA, in states in which people 
with pre-existing conditions face the same premium as healthy people, tax subsidies have no 
effect on either group.  In the second essay, “How do minimum medical loss ratio rules affect 
insurance markets? Historical evidence from Michigan,” I use the introduction of a minimum 
medical loss ratio rule in Michigan to show that a minimum MLR rule results in at least a six 
percentage point decrease in MLRs among for-profit commercial insurers.  The reduction in 
commercial medical loss ratios was driven by a disproportionate increase in premium 
revenue.  The findings of this paper suggest that the establishment of a minimum MLR rule can 
result in lower MLRs, possibly because of tacit collusion.  Because the minimum MLR rule 
limits the price of health insurance, it is similar to a price ceiling, which has been shown to result 
in tacit collusion.    In the third essay, “Do Pap smears reduce cervical cancer mortality? 
Evidence from federal family planning funding,” I use quasi-experimental variation in the 
 x 
 
availability of subsidized pap smears to estimate the effect of pap smears on cervical cancer 
mortality. I find that large increases in the likelihood of receiving a Pap smear in the last year do 
not correspond to changes in cervical cancer mortality or incidence, but the estimates are too 
imprecise to rule out existing estimates from the literature.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
On March 23rd, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), the first successful attempt at major health reform in nearly half a 
century.  At the time of its passage, the need for health reform was particularly urgent.  The rate 
of employer-sponsored insurance coverage had steadily declined since it was first measured in 
1987, covering only 55 percent of Americans in an employer-based health insurance system 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011).  At the same time, the private alternative to 
employer-sponsored coverage—insurance purchased directly from insurers in the non-employer 
market—was often difficult to obtain.  Because these markets are characterized by adverse 
selection, insurance premiums were high relative to comparable employer-sponsored plans, and 
many individuals with high medical costs were excluded from the market altogether.  As a result, 
nearly 55 million Americans, or 16 percent of the population, lacked health insurance coverage, 
putting them at risk of bad health outcomes and financial insecurity (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Smith 2011; Council of Economic Advisers 2011).   
The main goal of the ACA is to expand coverage to 32 million people, and about half of 
this increase is expected to come from reforms that affect the private health insurance market 
(Congressional Budget Office 2010).  The cornerstones of private health insurance market 
reform are large subsidies to reduce the price of health insurance for middle-
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income Americans, and a host of new rules affecting the characteristics of plans insurers may 
offer, and to whom they must offer.  These rules include limits on how insurers set premiums, a 
ban on health insurance denials, and requirements that insurers spend a minimum fraction of 
premiums on benefits and cover a basic set of benefits (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013b).  
These aspects of the law are controversial and have major economic implications.  
Proponents of these reforms say they will increase access to medical care, improve health and 
financial stability, and create jobs (Council of Economic Advisers 2012, 2009a).  Opponents of 
the reforms say they will increase spending, have no effect on health, and destroy jobs (John 
Boehner 2011).  Because many of the ACA’s key provisions did not go into effect until 2014, 
many of the health and economic impacts of the law remain an open question.  Given uncertainty 
over the effects of the law, health policy researchers must find similar policy experiments in the 
past and use causal inference techniques to estimate their impact and predict what will happen 
under the ACA. 
This dissertation is composed of three such policy evaluations.  I am concerned with the 
effect of aspects of private health insurance market reform on labor markets, health insurance 
markets, and health.  In each of three essays, I use comparable state- or local-level policy to 
evaluate three claims of policymakers: that the ACA will result in increased self-employment, 
that the ACA will lower premiums and increase the value of insurance, and that the ACA will 
result in better health.    
In the first essay, “Entrepreneurship and job lock:  
the interaction between tax subsidies and health insurance regulations,” I estimate the effect of 
health insurance tax subsidies for the self-employed on the probability of self-employment, 
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accounting for interactions with state health insurance regulations affecting both the price of 
insurance and whether insurance is offered at any price.  Because people with health conditions 
often face higher prices and/or limits on coverage, or are denied health insurance coverage at any 
price in the individual, non-employer health insurance market, they cannot benefit from tax 
subsidies designed to encourage self-employment.   
Using federal and state variation in health insurance tax deductions for the self-employed 
between 1999 and 2005, I show that the effect of subsidies depend crucially on state insurance 
market regulation, especially for people with pre-existing conditions.  I derive a simple model of 
the choice between employment and self-employment as a function of the after-tax price of 
health insurance, the relationship between health status and premiums, and individual health 
expenditures to illustrate that the effect of tax subsidies depends on coverage options in the non-
group market.  The model predicts that tax subsidies have no effect on self-employment for 
people with pre-existing conditions in markets in which pre-existing conditions are grounds for 
coverage denial.  In contrast, tax subsidies have a stronger effect for people with pre-existing 
conditions, compared to those without, when they can purchase coverage at a higher price.  The 
model predicts that people with and without pre-existing conditions respond similarly to one 
another in markets in which premiums do not vary with health status.   
I operationalize the theoretical model empirically with a specification that allows 
treatment effects of tax subsidies for self-employed health insurance to differ by the presence of 
a pre-existing condition and the price and accessibility of non-group market insurance.  
Empirical results using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics confirm the model’s predictions: 
households with pre-existing conditions are more likely to be self-employed in response to tax 
deductions than are households with healthy members in states in which they can purchase risk-
 4 
 
rated health insurance.  But, they do not respond at all in states in which they should expect to be 
denied a policy altogether.  In states in which insurers are prohibited from denying insurance or 
using health information to set premiums, health insurance tax deductions appear to have no 
effect on self-employment for either type of household.      
In the second essay, “How do minimum medical loss ratio rules affect insurance markets?  
Historical evidence from Michigan,” I estimate the effect of a minimum medical loss ratio rule 
similar to that included in the ACA. The ACA requires all insurers to spend a minimum fraction 
of premium revenue on medical care and quality improvement.  This fraction is called a medical 
loss ratio.  Although policymakers predict that the rule will result in higher medical loss ratios, 
the rule creates complex incentives that could actually result in lower loss ratios.  I use the 
introduction of a minimum medical loss ratio rule in Michigan in 1974 to measure the effect of 
this type of policy on loss ratios.  I outline a conceptual framework that illustrates how minimum 
loss ratio rules can result in tacit collusion and why the medical loss ratio may fall among for-
profit insurers as a result.  Then I estimate the effect of the rule on Michigan’s for-profit insurers 
using state-level data on average insurer loss ratios from Health Insurance Association of 
America member surveys.  The results suggest that the average loss ratio fell by at least six 
percentage points among for-profit insurers in Michigan.  Using state-level data on the 
components of the loss ratio, I show that for-profit insurers in Michigan achieved decreases in 
the loss ratio through a disproportionate increase in premiums. 
In the third essay, “Do Pap smears reduce cervical cancer mortality?  
Evidence from federal family planning funding,” I explore whether Pap smears, a cancer 
screening that the ACA requires insurers to cover without any cost-sharing, affect cervical cancer 
mortality.  Although the Pap smear is widely credited for dramatic reductions in cervical cancer 
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over the 20th century, time-series evidence does not suggest it played a large role in these 
reductions.  Due to the ethical challenges of withholding a presumed beneficial cancer screening, 
the test has never been evaluated in a randomized controlled trial, and observational studies that 
claim to support its effectiveness suffer from internal validity problems that preclude causal 
inference.   
In this essay, I exploit a natural experiment in the availability of subsidized reproductive 
care to establish the true effect of Pap smears on cervical cancer mortality.  Leveraging the 
chaotic nature in which initial federal grants for family planning clinics were administered to 
community organizations between 1965 and 1973, I find that an 8-13 percent increase in use of 
cervical cancer screening as a result of funding did not result in statistically significant changes 
in cervical cancer mortality.  However, the results are inconclusive because the estimates are 
imprecise.   
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Chapter 2 Entrepreneurship and job lock:  
the interaction between tax subsidies and health insurance regulations 
 
[The Affordable Care Act] will unleash tremendous entrepreneurial power into our 
economy. Imagine a society and an economy where a person could change jobs without 
losing health insurance; where they could be self-employed … or start a small business. 
Imagine an economy where people could follow their passions and their talent without 
having to worry that their children would not have health insurance -- that if they had a 
… pre-existing medical condition in their family, that they would [not] be job locked. 
Under this bill, their entrepreneurial spirit will be unleashed.  
--Nancy Pelosi (2010) 
 
Introduction 
Economists have long speculated that the connection between employment and health 
insurance discourages the would-be self-employed from striking out on their own (Council of 
Economic Advisers 2009a; Government Accountability Office 2012b).  This feature of the labor 
market is part of a larger phenomenon of reduced job separations associated with employer-
sponsored benefits, called “job lock”(Madrian 1994).  While job lock affects mobility between 
jobs and decisions to become retired (Gruber and Madrian 2002), it should especially inhibit 
transitions from jobs with health insurance to self-employment because the alternative to 
employer-sponsored insurance—“non-group” coverage purchased directly from an insurer—is 
both costly (Whitmore et al. 2011) and sometimes completely inaccessible for people with health 
conditions (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012).  Since the 1990’s, Federal and state policymakers 
have responded to self-employment related job lock with either insurance market reforms or tax-
based health insurance subsidies.  Both types of policies try to alleviate job lock by lowering the 
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cost of non-group coverage.  One of the primary objectives of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is 
to lower the cost of non-group coverage, and therefore reduce job lock, through a combination of 
both non-group insurance market reforms and health insurance tax subsidies for non-group 
coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013b).  The combination of these policies is expected to 
increase self-employment, especially among those with pre-existing health conditions (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2009b; Government Accountability Office 2012b), by 1.5 million people 
after 2014 (Blumberg, Corlette, and Lucia 2013).  
In this paper, I measure the effect of health insurance tax subsidies for the self-employed 
on individuals’ probability of self-employment.  Using Federal and state variation in health 
insurance tax deductions for the self-employed between 1999 and 2005, I show that this effect 
depends crucially on state insurance market regulation, especially for people with pre-existing 
conditions.  I derive a simple model of the choice between employment and self-employment as 
a function of the after-tax price of health insurance, the relationship between health status and 
premiums, and individual health expenditures to illustrate that the effect of tax subsidies depends 
on coverage options in the non-group market.  The model predicts that tax subsidies have no 
effect on self-employment for people with pre-existing conditions in markets in which pre-
existing conditions are grounds for coverage denial.  In contrast, tax subsidies have a stronger 
effect for people with pre-existing conditions, compared to those without when they can 
purchase coverage at a higher price.  The model predicts that people with and without pre-
existing conditions respond similarly to one another in markets in which premiums do not vary 
with health status.   
I operationalize the theoretical model empirically with a specification that allows 
treatment effects of tax subsidies for self-employed health insurance to differ by the presence of 
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a pre-existing condition and the price and accessibility of non-group market insurance.  
Empirical results using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics confirm the model’s predictions: 
households with pre-existing conditions are more likely to be self-employed in response to tax 
deductions than are households with healthy members in states in which they can purchase risk-
rated health insurance.  But, they do not respond at all in states in which they should expect to be 
denied a policy altogether.  In states in which insurers are prohibited from denying insurance or 
using health information to set premiums, health insurance tax deductions appear to have no 
effect on self-employment for either type of household.      
This paper makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literatures on health 
insurance tax subsidies and self-employment, and non-group market regulations and self-
employment.  My theoretical framework is the first to formalize the connection between health 
insurance tax subsidies, non-group market regulations, and heterogeneous health status in a 
model of self-employment and health insurance.  It also is the first in these literatures to 
incorporate a well-known feature of the non-group market: that people with pre-existing 
conditions are often denied health insurance altogether, even when insurers could charge them 
higher premiums.  I show that state-based limits on the use of riders to exclude coverage for pre-
existing conditions play a role in insurance denials.  This paper’s further, empirical contribution 
is to construct measures of pre-existing conditions and use them to estimate separately the 
treatment effect of non-group market tax subsidies for households that can and cannot purchase 
non-group market health insurance.    
Furthermore, these findings have important policy implications.  First, they provide an 
evaluation of the effects of a Federal and state tax policy intended to increase self-employment 
through health insurance tax deductions.  The results suggest that the benefits of this tax subsidy 
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for the self-employed accrued unevenly across households by health status.  In particular, 
households that contained a member with a pre-existing condition did not benefit from tax 
subsidies at all in places where they could likely not purchase health insurance.  In effect, this 
policy magnified the disadvantages of being excluded from the non-group market for people 
with pre-existing conditions.  
Second, the results can inform current policy debates in several ways.  The results 
provide support for the ACA’s two-pronged approach—non-group market reforms and health 
insurance tax subsidies for non-group insurance.  Efforts to lower the cost of health insurance 
through tax policy must be paired with regulations that prevent insurers from denying coverage 
to people with pre-existing conditions.  Otherwise, this group cannot benefit from the tax subsidy 
at all.  Recent efforts to selectively repeal parts of the ACA should therefore be viewed with 
caution.   
The results reported in this paper also help inform projections of the likely impact of the 
ACA’s tax subsidies on self-employment.  Because health insurance tax subsidies for the self-
employed have little effect on self-employment in states with regulations that most closely 
mirror those enacted by the ACA, the estimates imply that the ACA’s premium tax subsidies 
may also have little effect on self-employment.   
 
Background  
Job lock and self-employment 
In the United States, 90 percent of private coverage among non-elderly adults is 
purchased as a fringe benefit of employment through an employer (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Smith 2011).  Purchasing coverage through an employer (group coverage) is significantly less 
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expensive than purchasing it directly from an insurance company (non-group coverage).  The 
link between health insurance and employment reduces job separations as workers are reluctant 
to leave jobs with group coverage for fear of increased premiums or loss of coverage altogether 
(Madrian 1994). Along with reducing worker mobility between jobs, job lock especially deters 
transitions from employment to self-employment because of the considerable difference in cost 
between group and non-group coverage (Whitmore et al. 2011).   
The price difference exists for three reasons: economies of scale in plan administration, 
greater tax advantages to employer-sponsored coverage, and favorable risk pooling for workers 
with health conditions in group coverage. Relative to the self-employed or employees of small 
firms, employees of large firms enjoy economies of scale in plan administrative costs.  The 
difference between the expected payout and premiums, or load, depends on the size of the group 
purchasing coverage.  If the firm is large, the administrative costs associated with administering 
the plan are small relative to individual premiums.  However, if the firm is small, overhead costs 
may constitute a large fraction of the premium.  Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, and Phelps (2011) 
estimate that loads represent only four percent of the premium for firms with greater than 10,000 
employees, but roughly one-third of the premium for firms with fewer than 100 employees.  
Loads create an inverse relationship between premiums and firm size.  
Secondly, while the employed enjoy a substantial tax advantage on their premium costs, 
the self-employed do not.  In group coverage, the employer excludes its share of the premium 
payments from payroll tax and employees do not pay income tax on the employers’ 
contributions.  In most cases, employees may also pay for their share of premiums with pre-tax 
dollars if the employer sponsors a Section 125 plan (Thomasson 2003; Lang and Kang 2007).  In 
contrast, the tax code provided no health insurance subsidy for the self-employed until 1986. 
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And while the introduction of Federal and state health insurance premium deductions for the 
self-employed between 1986 and 2004 lessened the disparity, the value of this tax subsidy today 
is much less than that of the tax advantage enjoyed by the employed (Selden 2009).  
Finally, group coverage is relatively less expensive for workers with health conditions 
because it spreads risk across employees, subsidizing the care of high-cost employees with 
premiums from low-cost employees.  In contrast, non-group coverage may directly reflect the 
health status of the individual purchasing coverage.  This practice is called “medical 
underwriting” and it results in higher premiums or full denial of coverage for individuals with a 
history of high-cost medical conditions, or “pre-existing conditions.”  Since job lock appears to 
be a serious impediment to self-employment in the United States, policy makers have considered 
a variety of reforms to reduce it. 
 
Remedies for job lock: non-group market reforms 
One approach to reducing job lock seeks to decrease the cost of non-group coverage for 
self-employed people with pre-existing health conditions through reforms to medical 
underwriting practices.  Such reforms make health insurance more affordable and accessible to 
individuals with pre-existing health conditions.  For example, the adoption of community rating 
requires that insurers must charge everyone the same price for health insurance regardless of 
health status.  Paired with guaranteed issue, insurers must also issue insurance to every person 
who applies. Medical underwriting reforms determine not only the price of insurance for people 
with health conditions but also whether it is offered at any price.   
The research on non-group market reforms and self-employment suggests that such 
reforms have little effect.  Comparing states that adopted community rating and guaranteed issue 
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in the 1990’s to those that did not, Heim and Lurie (2013a) find no increase in self-employment 
on average.  Using a similar strategy comparing New Jersey to other states in the region, 
DeCicca (2007) finds that a package of non-group market reforms—including community rating 
and guaranteed issue—increased self-employment by 15-25 percent in the first three years of the 
reform.  But DeCicca’s result appears to be temporary; with the inclusion of several more years 
of post-policy observations, Heim and Lurie (2013a) show that the increase in self-employment 
did not persist.   
 
Remedies for job lock: health insurance tax deductions 
The second type of policy tries to reduce the cost of non-group health insurance through 
Federal and state premium tax deductions for the self-employed.  Deductions reduce the after-tax 
cost of health insurance.  Before 1986, self-employed people who purchased non-group coverage 
paid the full cost of health insurance without any tax subsidies.  Beginning with the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, the Federal government allowed self-employed people without access to employer-
sponsored coverage to deduct a fraction of health insurance costs from their income tax returns.  
Over the following years, most states followed suit.  By 2004, the self-employed could deduct 
the full cost of health insurance from both Federal and state income tax returns in most states 
(Selden 2009).   
Several papers find that tax deductions increase a variety of self-employment measures.  
Velamuri (2012) finds that the introduction of a partial Federal deduction in 1986 increased self-
employment by 14 to 25 percent among women in the Current Population Survey.  Using a panel 
of tax returns, (Heim and Lurie 2010) find that self-employment, measured by the amount of 
self-employment income reported on tax returns, increased by about 15 percent between 1999 
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and 2004.  Gurley-Calvez (2011) finds that deductions decrease self-employment exit by seven 
percent during the same period.   
 
Interaction of non-group market reforms and tax subsidies 
Health insurance tax subsidies and non-group market regulations have generally been 
studied separately, but the primary contribution of this paper is to describe and estimate the ways 
in which these two policies interact.  While tax-based reform provides a subsidy that lowers the 
after-tax cost for all self-employed taxpayers, the value of the subsidy depends on the pre-tax 
premium.  People who pay higher premiums benefit more from deductions.  Depending on the 
type of medical underwriting permitted by law, people with health conditions pay higher pre-tax 
premiums or are not offered a policy at all.  The consequence of this interaction is that the 
benefits of health insurance deductions range from greater than average when people with pre-
existing conditions pay risk-rated premiums, to zero when they cannot purchase a policy at any 
price.   
Only one paper attempts to study the combined effect of both policies.  Using a panel of 
tax returns, Heim and Lurie (2013b) separately estimate the effect of deductions on self-
employment in states with heavy, moderate, and light levels of non-group underwriting reforms 
that affect the price of insurance.  They find that the effect of tax subsidies is different in states 
with heavy regulation compared to those with light or moderate regulations.  The authors 
attribute differences in the effect to differences in the pre-tax premiums induced by different 
amounts of regulation.  Consistent with this observation, they find that the effect among 
taxpayers over age 40 is strongest in the heavily regulated states in which premiums are not 
permitted to vary substantially with age.     
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These results are suggestive, but cannot fully capture the interaction between insurance 
regulation and tax policy.  First, state-level restrictions on non-group market underwriting 
practices lead to variation in not only the price, but also the probability of being offered a policy 
at any price.  This feature of non-group markets is important because in states where 
underwriting practices result in denial of coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions, 
tax subsidies have no benefit.  Pre-existing conditions-based coverage denials are likely common 
because 60 million working Americans are estimated to have a pre-existing condition 
(Government Accountability Office 2012a) and one in seven applications to the four largest 
insurers is denied because of a pre-existing condition (Waxman and Stupak 2010).  Second, 
identifying individuals who pay more for non-group coverage or are excluded from the non-
group market altogether requires data on past health status, which are not available in most 
datasets.  Although insurers use demographic information such as age to set premiums, they rely 
primarily on medical history when medical underwriting is permitted (National Association of 
Insurance Comissioners 2012).   
I also incorporate differences across states in the treatment of the self-employed in the 
group market for small employers (small group).   Although states may be classified as having 
heavy, moderate, and light levels of non-group underwriting reforms, within each group, there 
are some states that allow the self-employed to participate in the small group market as a “group-
of-one.”  Beginning in 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act established 
nationwide limits on medical underwriting in the small-group market.  While the price of 
coverage was still allowed to vary with health status, the law required insurers to offer coverage 
to all applicants and prevented insurers from denying coverage to people with pre-existing 
conditions (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013a).  For this reason, self-employed people who live in 
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states that 1) allow non-group market insurers to use medical underwriting, and 2) allow self-
employed people to participate in the small-group market can be expected to purchase coverage 
in the small-group market.  Because the small-group market has more protections to assure 
affordability and accessibility of coverage for people with health conditions than the states with 
light or moderate regulation of the non-group market, self-employment should increase more 
among this group.  Including people who purchase insurance in the small-group market instead 
should overstate the effect of tax subsidies in lightly regulated states.   
The following sections outline a theoretical model and empirical strategy that account for 
each of these issues.  I model the self-employment response to tax subsidies in states with 
different kinds of insurance regulation, paying special attention to the legality of denying 
coverage.  The model generates predictions for workers with and without pre-existing conditions 
in different regulatory environments.  Next, I construct a unique dataset from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics that contains data on individual health histories as well as state insurance 
regulations, which allow me to test the predictions of the theoretical model.   
 
Theoretical framework 
Individuals with heterogeneous health risks should respond differently to health insurance 
tax subsidies in the presence of heterogeneous non-group market regulations.  Heim and Lurie 
(2013b) suggest this idea without formalizing it, by noting that the decision to become self-
employed should vary with the change in the price induced by regulation across states.  I 
formalize the decision as a function of factors that affect both the price and accessibility of health 
insurance: the tax price of health insurance in each sector, presence of pre-existing conditions, 
state non-group market regulations affecting risk-rating and denials, and their interactions.  
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For the self-employed, the value of a tax subsidy depends on the pre-tax price of health 
insurance.  More formally, assume individuals have preferences over wages net of health 
insurance costs in the self-employed and employed sectors ( ∈ (, )): 	
 = (	
 − 	
).  	
 
is the wage individual i receives in each sector, j, and 	
 is the individual’s after-tax cost of 
health insurance.  I assume that wages are fully offset by employer contributions and employers 
pay for the entire premium.  Therefore 	 is the wage minus the employer-sponsored premium 
for employed workers.  If all individuals purchase health insurance, then 	
 − 	
 are the wages 
net of the total after-tax cost of health insurance.  I assume increasing utility (′ > 0) and 
decreasing marginal utility (′′ < 0). 
 
Tax prices 
The after-tax cost to the individual is a function of the tax price of health insurance, 	
, 
and before-tax premiums in each sector, 	
: 
(1) 	
 = 	
	
  
The tax price describes the reduction in the unit after-tax price of a good as a function of 
marginal tax rates and tax subsidies for the good.  For example, if the tax price of health 
insurance is 0.4, it means that the taxpayer pays only 40 cents for a dollar’s worth of health 
insurance after health insurance tax subsidies have been taken into account.  Put another way, if 
the tax code did not subsidize health insurance at all, the tax price would be equal to one.  The 
tax price of health insurance in the self-employed sector is 1 −  −  where  and  are 
federal and state marginal tax rates, and  and  are the fractions of premiums self-employed 
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persons may deduct from federal and state income taxes.  As the deductions increase, the tax 
price of health insurance for the self-employed falls for a given pair of  and .  Recall that  
and  vary exogenously over time and across states.  The tax price in the employed sector is 

   where ! is the marginal tax rate the employer pays on benefits, or the payroll 
marginal tax rate.  The employed tax price expresses the cost of health insurance to the employee 
in terms of foregone wages.  Because employer-sponsored premiums are excluded from taxable 
income, employers are indifferent between paying one dollar of benefits and   dollars in 
wages (Gruber and Poterba 1994).  The employee’s wages are reduced by "
#$%
  , and 
therefore 	 expresses how the fraction of premiums paid changes with marginal tax rates. 
 
Pre-tax premiums 
While premiums for the employed () do not vary at the individual level, premiums in 
the non-group market (	) can, depending on the type of regulatory environment.  Non-group 
insurance markets are at risk for adverse selection.  This is a problem for insurers because 
adverse selection can result in large financial losses and destabilize markets (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz 1976).  To mitigate adverse selection in the non-group market, insurers can charge higher 
prices for people with pre-existing conditions, exclude coverage related to those conditions, or 
refuse to offer these people coverage altogether.  The legality of these tools is determined by 
three types of non-group market regulations: community rating, guaranteed issue, and 
prohibitions on elimination riders.  Community rating and guaranteed issue (as described above) 
prohibit insurers in the non-group market from varying premiums with health risk and require 
insurers to offer health insurance to all who apply.  While the effect of community rating and 
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guaranteed issue on a variety of non-group market outcomes has been studied previously 
(Herring and Pauly 2006; Heim and Lurie 2013a; LoSasso and Lurie 2009), the last type of 
policy—prohibitions on elimination riders—has not been adequately studied.   
Elimination riders are limits on coverage written into a health insurance policy that carve 
out coverage related to a pre-existing condition (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012).  Prohibitions 
on elimination riders prevent insurers from placing such limits on coverage.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests they play an important role in determining coverage accessibility for people with pre-
existing conditions (Kaiser Family Foundation 2001).  If elimination riders are permitted, 
insurers can exclude coverage related to the pre-existing condition either temporarily or 
permanently.  With such exclusions, people with pre-existing health conditions can at least 
purchase coverage for other types of care unrelated to the condition.  Recent work by Hendren 
(2013) suggests that insurers deny coverage to people with pre-existing conditions because they 
have more private information about their own health risks than people without such conditions.  
Therefore, insurers choose not to offer people with pre-existing conditions coverage, even at an 
actuarially fair premium.  Elimination riders may allow insurers to sell insurance to people with 
pre-existing conditions while limiting the probability of large losses.  Indeed, elimination riders 
are commonly used among the nation’s four largest insurers (Waxman and Stupak 2010).     
The interaction of these three types of regulations affects accessibility and affordability of 
insurance in the non-group market, especially for people with pre-existing conditions. I define 
three types of non-group market regulatory schemes.  “Risk-rated” states are states that have an 
absence of all three types of regulations or only have guaranteed issue.  In these states, insurers 
should offer coverage to people with pre-existing health conditions, but the premium should vary 
with health risk, and coverage for the pre-existing condition may be excluded.  “Denial” states 
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are defined as states that prohibit elimination riders only, allowing insurers to risk-rate or deny 
policies but not to carve out expensive coverage from a policy.  In these states, insurers should 
offer risk-rated coverage to moderate health risks but deny coverage altogether to those with pre-
existing conditions because they would be forced to cover costly benefits if they did issue a 
policy.  States that have all three regulations and thus prohibit insurers from using any adverse 
selection mitigation strategy are defined as “community-rated” states.  In these states, insurers 
cannot vary premiums with health risks, nor can they deny or carve out costly coverage.  Table 
one shows the distribution of these policies across states.   
The function &('	) relates individual expected medical expenditures ('	) to premiums 
in each type of state.  In risk-rated states in which people with high expected medical 
expenditures pay more for health insurance, &′('	) > 0.  In denial states in which people with 
pre-existing conditions—a proxy for high expected medical expenditures—are denied insurance, 
&('	) is a discontinuous function.  For people with low values of '	, &′('	) > 0.  But, for 
people with values of '	 above a critical threshold (m*),  &('	) = ∞ because they are not 
offered a policy at any price.  I define households with pre-existing conditions as having 
'	 > '∗.  Finally, in community-rated states in which medical underwriting is prohibited, 
&′('	) = 0 because premiums do not vary across expected medical expenditures. 
 
Choice between sectors 
Individuals choose self-employment if and only if the utility of self-employment is 
greater than the utility of employed work: 	 − 	 > 0.  Wages net of after-tax health 
insurance costs for the self-employed are 	 − &('	)(1 −  − ).  Substituting wages 
net of after-tax health insurance costs into the utility function and differentiating with respect to 
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deductions shows that, as the deductible fraction of premiums rises, so do the benefits of self-
employment because the right-hand side of the equation is positive.  This is true for all types of 
states. 
(2)  )*+
#
), = 
′(	 − 	)&('	) > 0                      )*+
#
), = 
′(	 − 	)&('	) > 0 
Note that I assume that all individuals purchase insurance, that 	
 > 	
, and that '	 is 
strictly positive. 
To see how non-group regulations matter, consider the effect of the premium function, 
&('	), on the partial effect of deductions on self-employment and the necessary and sufficient 
condition for self-employment. 
Risk-rated states:  
Because &′('	) > 0 and ′′ < 0, 
(3)  )
-*+#
),).+	 = &
′('	) 0′ + ′′$ − 1%&('	)2 > 0  
Therefore people with higher expected medical expenditures should be more likely to 
switch to self-employment.  Note that the same is true for )
-*+#
),).+	. 
Denial states:   
For people with &′('	) > 0, the benefits of deductions increase in '	 as in risk-rated 
states.  But for those who are denied because of a pre-existing condition, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for self-employment can never be satisfied because &('	) = ∞ and so, 
(4)  3	 −  $%  4 > (	
 − &('	)$1 −  − %)   
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Note that these individuals would benefit greatly from deductions because 
56'7(.+)→∞ )
-*+#
),).+	 = ∞, but they never do because the utility of wage and salary work always 
exceeds that of self-employment. 
Community-rated states:  
In these states, premiums do not depend on '	, so, )
-*+#
),).+	 = 0 and the benefits of 
deductions do not depend on '	 either.  
 
Predictions 
This model has three testable predictions: 
Prediction 1: In risk-rated states, the effect of deductions is greater among people with 
pre-existing conditions than those without. 
Prediction 2: In denial states, deductions have no effect on people with pre-existing 
conditions. 
Prediction 3:  In community-rated states, there is no difference in the effect between 
people with and without pre-existing conditions. 
The following section describes how I test these predictions using data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. 
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Empirical approach 
Previous literature approach 
The preceding theoretical framework shows that the effect of tax deductions should be 
stronger for people with pre-existing conditions when health insurance is risk-rated but zero in 
markets where denial is likely.  The effect of increasing health insurance tax subsidies should not 
differ between people with and without pre-existing conditions where medical underwriting is 
prohibited.  As in previous work in this field, I estimate the effect of tax subsidies at the 
household level.  My innovation relative to previous empirical work is to separately identify the 
treatment effect by both the presence of a household member with a pre-existing condition and 
the type of non-group market regulations in the state.  The existing literature estimates the effect 
of the tax prices of health insurance in each sector on the likelihood of self-employment (Gumus 
and Regan 2009; Gurley-Calvez 2011; Heim and Lurie 2010, 2013b).  To estimate my own 
model, I begin with the approach taken most frequently in previous work, regressing a measure 
of self-employment on the logged tax price of health insurance in each sector, a set of controls, 
and household-level fixed effects: 
(5) Pr	(;<	=) = >?+>ln	(	,= ) + >B ln$	,= % + C	=D +	E	 + &= + F	 
The dependent variable (;<	=) indicates self-employment at the household-level based on 
self-employment income reported on income tax returns (Heim and Lurie 2010, 2013b; Gurley-
Calvez 2011) or self-reported self-employment (Gumus and Regan 2009).  The key independent 
variables are the logs of the tax prices in the self-employed and employed sectors,	1 −  −
 and   , which are represented by 	


.  Ideally, the independent variables would be 
the after tax cost—the product of the premium and the tax price—but premiums are not observed 
in the data.  Other researchers have dealt with this problem by assuming that differences between 
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households in the premium are a function of the covariates in the model.  Both tax prices enter 
into the equation linearly because individuals weigh the cost of non-group and group coverage in 
choosing whether to be self-employed. 
The tax prices are lagged because people do not know their marginal tax rate in the 
current year, so they use the previous year’s rate as a best guess.  The coefficients > and >B are 
the semi-elasticities of self-employment with respect to each tax price.  Because self-
employment and non-group health insurance are complements, > should be negative; as non-
group health insurance becomes less (more) expensive, self-employment should increase 
(decrease).  The sign of >B should be positive because non-group and employer-sponsored 
coverage are substitutes.  Because 	,=  varies little, the predicted sign of >B is ambiguous and 
the magnitude should be small.   
In previous work of this kind, controls typically include rudimentary demographic 
information contained on a tax return such as family size, marital status, and age (C	=). 
Household-level fixed effects (E	) are used to control for differences in health status that affect 
both the tax price and self-employment between households.  But while these fixed effects are 
intended to control for differences across households in both the price and demand for insurance, 
health characteristics vary over time, such that E	 can only partially control for these differences.  
Other models also include year effects (&=) to control for secular trends in self-employment. 
 
Theory-motivated approach 
The previously used econometric model estimates the average effect of tax deductions on 
self-employment but cannot capture important heterogeneity related to the presence of pre-
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existing conditions within the household and the price and accessibility of non-group insurance 
across states.  The theoretical framework shows that the effect of the tax prices differs across 
state groups and expected medical expenditures.  Therefore, I allow the effect to vary over both 
characteristics by interacting a measure of pre-existing conditions with the tax price of health 
insurance in each sector and estimating the following model in each of the three types of states: 
(6)	Pr	(;<	=) = G?+Gln	(	,= ) + GB ln$	,= % + GHI<J	=	 
+GKLln(	,= ) × I<J	=N + GOLln(	,= ) × I<J	=N + C	=D + P	=Q + &= + E	 + R	 
In this model, I<J	= indicates that the head of the household or his wife has ever been 
diagnosed with a medical conditions that would be considered a pre-existing condition if they 
were to try to buy health insurance in the non-group market at time t.  Because equation (6) is 
estimated separately for each type of state, the interaction terms give the differential effect of the 
tax price of health insurance on self-employment for households with a pre-existing condition in 
each kind of state.  Therefore G + GK is the semi-elasticity of self-employment with respect to 
the self-employed tax price among households that contain a person with a pre-existing condition 
in risk-rated, denial, or community-rated states.  Assuming that tax deductions have an effect for 
households that do not contain a person with a pre-existing condition (G < 0), the sign and 
statistical significance of GK in each of the three state regulatory environments amounts to a test 
of predictions (1)-(3).  In risk-rated states, I expect GK < 0 because households that contain a 
person with a pre-existing condition (pre-existing condition households) should pay more for 
health insurance than those that do not.  Therefore, pre-existing condition households benefit 
more from the tax deduction.  In denial states, I expect GK > 0 because pre-existing conditions 
households should be denied health insurance altogether.  Finally, in community-rated states, I 
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expect GK = 0 because both types of households pay similar prices regardless of expected 
medical expenditures.   
My approach also differs from the existing literature in the use of controls.  I supplement 
the rudimentary demographic and income controls previously used (C	=) with a rich set of time-
varying household-level health controls (P	=).  The vector P	= includes the self-reported health 
status of the head and wife, health-related absenteeism of the head and wife due to his/her own or 
a family member’s illness, the presence of disabilities that limit the work of the head or wife, and 
measures of sedentary lifestyle, smoking status, and obesity for the head and wife.  I also include 
household-level fixed effects (E	), as in equation (5). 
 
Synthetic tax price instruments 
Health insurance tax prices are a function of both the exogenously changing deduction 
and marginal tax rates.  Marginal tax rates are endogenous to self-employment because self-
employment income and marginal tax rates are jointly determined; individuals decide how much 
self-employment income to make based on their expected marginal tax rate, but the marginal tax 
rate is also affected by self-employment income.  A solution to this problem is to instrument for 
the tax prices using synthetic tax prices that do not reflect the simultaneity of self-employment 
income and marginal tax rates.  The prevailing approach in the literature is to use the tax-filing 
characteristics from the first year the individual is observed in the panel to impute tax prices for 
the rest of the panel, omitting the first year.  I choose not to do this for two reasons.  First, I want 
to keep as many observations as possible because my sample is small, and second, past 
individual characteristics may still reflect the simultaneity of income and self-employment.   
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Instead, I construct synthetic tax price instruments using a two-step procedure similar to 
that used by Currie and Gruber (1996) to create simulated Medicaid eligibility.  First, I calculate 
the marginal tax rate each household would face in each state in the estimation sample if it had 
the same income and household characteristics it had in the year of observation.  Then I calculate 
the average marginal tax rate in that year by state, head’s five-year age-category, marital status, 
head’s sex, and number of dependents (censored at three).  These synthetic tax prices therefore 
reflect federal and state-by-year variation in the policy without being contaminated by the 
simultaneity of household marginal tax rates and self-employment.    
I use the synthetic tax prices as instruments in two-stage least squares regressions of self-
employment on the tax prices.  One concern with two-stage least squares is that the instruments 
are weak.  If they are weak, the bias in the two-stage least squares estimator approaches that of 
ordinary least squares.  In the case of one endogenous variable, the bias is inversely proportional 
to the F-statistic (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995).  Because both tax prices and their interactions 
are endogenous, the F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions are no 
longer helpful because the F-statistic might be large even if only one instrument is a strong 
predictor of the endogenous variable and the rest of the instruments are weak.  To test for weak 
instruments, I use a modification of the F-statistic for multivariate regressions proposed by 
Angrist and Pischke (2009a); (Angrist and Pischke 2009b).  To obtain the F-statistic, I regress 
the endogenous tax prices on the instruments after partialling-out the variation in the endogenous 
variable due to the other instruments.  In this way, I isolate the effect of the instruments on each 
of the endogenous variables.  The results from first-stage regressions and the F-statistics are 
reported in Table 2.7.  The first-stage coefficients on the synthetic tax prices are always positive 
and strongly predictive of the endogenous tax prices.  The value of the F-statistic on the 
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excluded instruments ranges from 48 to 70 in regressions as specified in equation (5), and from 
14 to 575 in my main results, as specified in equation (6).  They are sufficiently large to suggest 
that the estimates do not suffer from bias due to weak instruments.   
 
Data 
There are very few datasets that contain information on self-employment, detailed 
income data necessary to calculate marginal tax rates, and retrospective information on health 
conditions.  While tax return data can accurately capture self-employment and marginal tax rates, 
available controls for health status are limited to crude demographic variables such as age.  Even 
surveys like the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
which contain information on current health status as well as self-employment measures and 
income characteristics, are not useful for the purpose of this study because current health status 
may be only weakly associated with past conditions.  Datasets with rich health information such 
as the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey do not contain detailed income characteristics and so 
there is considerable measurement error in both the independent and dependent variables.  
Additionally, longitudinal data are desirable, and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey’s panel 
follows respondents for a maximum of two years.   
A dataset that contains all three elements necessary to study this problem—precise 
measures of self-employment, detailed income and filing characteristics necessary to calculate 
marginal tax rates, and retrospective information about health conditions—is the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted by the University of 
Michigan starting in 1968 and based on a probability sample of 4,800 households in 1967.  The 
purpose of the survey is to follow households over multiple generations in order to analyze 
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dynamic economic and demographic behavior (Hill 1991).  Retrospective health data were added 
to the study in 1999.   
The analysis uses a sample of 12,385 observations from 3,786 households from the 1999, 
2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the PSID.  From an initial sample of 9,148 households with non-
missing data, I restrict the sample to households that are observed at least twice during the study 
period (N= 7,438) with a prime working-age head aged 25 to 54 (N= 5,226).  I chose this age 
range rather than what is used in the literature, 25-64 (Gumus and Regan 2009; Heim and Lurie 
2010, 2013b, 2013a; Gurley-Calvez 2011) because I want to exclude households that are eligible 
for early-retiree health insurance.  Because people who can retire from their current work might 
chose to become self-employed because of early retiree health insurance rather than tax 
deductions, I exclude them from the sample.  I further restrict the sample to exclude the nine 
group-of-one states where the self-employed do not purchase health insurance in the non-group 
market (CO, CT, DE, FL, HI, MI, MS, NC, RI), the two states that changed regulations in the 
middle of the study period (KY, NH), and Oregon, which has community rating but no 
guaranteed issue (N= 3,786).  
The original PSID sample was composed of two distinct subsamples: a nationally 
representative sample, and an over-sample of low-income households, called the Survey of 
Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample (Brown 1996).  Because of problems with the sampling 
procedure used to construct the SEO sample, some have recommended disregarding the SEO 
sample (Shin and Solon 2011).  Omitting the 3,715 SEO households from my estimation sample 
does not affect the results.  Therefore I chose to use these observations in the analysis. 
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Table 2.1 shows that the PSID sample is fairly representative of the U.S. population.  
Each observation represents a household, and all variables except for age, sex, and race represent 
responses for both the head and his legal wife, if he is married.  Note that in the PSID, household 
heads are always male unless the head is a single woman.  Eighteen percent report that the head 
or wife is self-employed in their main job.  The sample statistics are similar to published 
statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census: 15.3 million Americans were 
self-employed in 2009, or 18 percent of the population aged 25 to 44 (Hipple 2010; Howden and 
Meyer 2011).   
The key independent variables are the tax prices of health insurance for the self-
employed and employed households.  They are continuous measures indicating the cost to the 
household of a dollar of health insurance after taxes are taken into account.  The self-employed 
tax price is identified with Federal and state-by-year changes in the statutory health insurance tax 
deduction for the self-employed.  Because the self-employed tax price is a non-linear function of 
both deductions and marginal tax rates, the interaction of deductions and marginal tax rates also 
provide identifying variation.  Figure one illustrates both types of variation over the study period.  
Tax prices depend on marginal tax rates, which are imputed using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research TAXSIM model (Version 9).  TAXSIM uses 22 inputs to impute federal, 
state, and payroll marginal tax rates.   These inputs are created from the PSID following (Butrica 
and Burkhauser 1997) and are described in Table 2.8.  For more details about the TAXSIM 
model, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993).  The average household tax price for the self-employed 
over the period is 85 percent, falling roughly 10 percent from 0.9 to 0.8 over the study period.  In 
contrast, the average household tax price for the employed is relatively constant over the period 
at 56 percent.  Trends in the synthetic tax price instruments are similar to trends in the tax price.  
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One major advantage of the PSID is that I can identify households that contain an 
individual with a pre-existing health condition that would result in denial of non-group health 
insurance in denial states.  Because the definition of a pre-existing condition is insurer specific, 
several definitions have been offered in the literature and are outlined in a report by the 
Government Accountability Office Government Accountability Office (2012a).  I construct two 
measures based on these definitions and work by Zellers, McLaughlin, and Frick (1992), who 
survey insurance companies to identify conditions that result in denial.  The first is a narrow 
definition of pre-existing conditions set to one if the head answers yes to the question “Has a 
doctor ever told you that you/[your wife] have or had one of the following conditions,” which 
include heart disease, cancer, heart attack, or stroke.  I also construct a broader measure of pre-
existing conditions using the same question but expanding the conditions to include high blood 
pressure, diabetes, lung disease, emotional problems, memory loss, and obesity.  By the narrow 
measure, 12 percent of households contain a person with a pre-existing condition and by the 
broad measure, 27 percent of households contain a person with pre-existing condition.  For 
comparison, the Government Accountability Office estimates that the fraction of the adult 
population with a pre-existing condition is between 20 and 66 percent (Government 
Accountability Office 2012a). 
A final key variable is the classification of states into one of three types of non-group 
market regulatory environments.  I classify states into risk-rated, denial, and community-rated 
states using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts Website (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2012) and a report by the Assistant Secretary for Evaluation and Planning (Assistant 
Secretary for Evaluation and Planning 2010).  Table 2.2 illustrates the distribution of these 
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policies across states.  Sixty percent of sample households reside in the 27 risk-rated states, 22 
percent reside in the five denial states and 19 percent reside in the six community-rated states.   
Two pieces of evidence support my state classification.  First, a study conducted by the 
Kaiser Family Foundation and the Georgetown Institute for Health Policy found that insurance 
companies in states with prohibitions on elimination riders and no guaranteed issue (denial 
states) were more likely to reject applicants than those in other states (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2001). Second, more recent data from the Department of Health and Human Services Center for 
Consumer Information and Oversight’s Plan Finder show that application denials are highest in 
denial states, and risk-rating is prevalent in both risk-rated and denial states (Department of 
Health and Human Services 2013).  Plan Finder is a national database of non-group and small 
group health insurance offerings designed to help people find coverage before the establishment 
of Exchanges in 2014 (Office of the Inspector General 2011).  Plan Finder collects 
characteristics of insurance plans including information about benefits, cost-sharing, and 
premiums.  The data also contain the fraction of applications that are denied in each quarter and 
the fraction of policies that are risk-rated because of health status in each quarter.  Data from the 
three most recent quarters shows that application denial rates are highest for insurers in denial 
states: seven percent versus four percent in risk-rated states and less than one percent in 
community-rated states.  Note that the observed denial rate might actually be too low if people 
with pre-existing conditions are anticipating denials and are therefore more likely to forgo 
applying altogether.  The average fraction of plans that are risk-rated is as expected.  The rate in 
risk-rated states is three percent, compared to almost zero in community-rated states.  Ten 
percent of policies are risk-rated in denial states.  
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My analysis also includes a variety of time varying, household, and individual-level 
health characteristics that have not been previously used in the literature.  They include self-
reported health status, health-related work limitations, absenteeism, low physical activity, current 
smoking status, and obesity.  Fourteen percent of households contain a head or wife who reports 
fair or poor health.  Seventeen percent report the presence of a condition that limits the amount 
or type of work the head or wife can do in their job.  The mean number of weeks the head reports 
having missed work in the last year due to personal illness or a family member’s illness is 0.8.  
Fifty-three percent of heads and their wives report having a sedentary lifestyle measured by 
getting less than one hour of physical activity a week.  Twenty-eight percent of households 
report having a head or wife who smokes and 34 percent of households report a head or wife 
who is obese.   
 
Empirical evidence 
Descriptive evidence 
A simple plot of the data provides visual evidence for the testable implications of my 
theory.  Figure two shows the trend in self-employment for both types of households using the 
narrow definition of a pre-existing condition.  Each panel of the figure depicts a state type: risk-
rated, denial, or community-rated.  Each figure also plots the average tax price for each type of 
household in each type of state, showing that the tax price of self-employed health insurance fell 
by a similar amount across household and state types.  In risk-rated states I find what is expected: 
self-employment rises more for pre-existing condition households than for households without a 
pre-existing condition, as tax prices fall.  In denial states, I expect that pre-existing condition 
households should not respond to the tax price of health insurance for the self-employed.  And 
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indeed, self-employment among non-pre-existing condition households increases by roughly five 
percentage points, but self-employment among pre-existing condition households remains 
constant at about 15 percent.  In community-rated states, I expect that the effect of tax prices 
should not differ between the two types of households.  I find partial evidence for this 
hypothesis.  Both lines are upward sloping, but it appears that self-employment for pre-existing 
condition households increases slightly less over the period than does self-employment for non-
pre-existing condition households.      
 
Regression results: replication of previous findings 
The first step of my formal analysis is to show that I can generate results consistent with 
previous findings using my PSID sample.  Column one of Table 2.3 replicates Heim and Lurie 
(2010) although the magnitude of my estimate is nearly twice as large.  In a model with 
demographic and income controls and household fixed effects, the estimated semi-elasticity of 
self-employment with respect to the self-employed tax price is −0.374.  This implies that the ten 
percent reduction in the tax price of self-employment over the period resulted in a 3.74 
percentage point increase in the self-employment rate between 1999 and 2005, holding the 
employed tax price constant.  As a fraction of the average level of self-employment in the 
balanced panel, the point estimate implies a 21 percent increase.  Heim and Lurie (2010) find 
that tax deductions increase self-employment by 15 percent over the same time period.   
The addition of time-varying health controls in column two has little effect on the 
estimates.  The magnitude of the semi-elasticity of self-employment with respect to the tax price 
falls slightly, but the statistical and economic significance of the estimate remains the same.  The 
only time-varying health regressor with a statistically significant effect on self-employment is an 
 34 
 
indicator of fair or poor self-reported health status for the head or his wife.  Those who report a 
member of the household in fair or poor health are almost two percentage points less likely to be 
self-employed.  The elasticity of self-employment with respect to the employed tax price has the 
expected sign and is statistically insignificant in both models. 
 
Regression results: risk-rated states 
The benefits of a tax deduction are greatest for households that pay higher premiums for 
the same amount of insurance.  Therefore, pre-existing condition households should respond 
more to deductions than non-pre-existing condition households in states in which they can buy 
an insurance policy but it costs more (prediction 1).  To test this prediction, I examine the sign 
and statistical significance of GH, the interaction coefficient of the self-employed tax price with 
the pre-existing conditions indicator.  The first column of Table 2.4 provides evidence consistent 
with this prediction using the narrow definition of pre-existing conditions.  In a model with time-
varying health and demographic controls as well as household fixed effects, GH = −0.472 and it 
is statistically significant (s.e.=0.207).  This implies that the semi-elasticity of self-employment 
with respect to the self-employed tax price is larger among households with pre-existing 
conditions than among other households.  The estimates imply that self-employment increased 
by 18 percent between 1999 and 2005 for non-pre-existing condition households but by about 45 
percent for pre-existing condition households.  The coefficients on the employed tax price and its 
interaction have the anticipated sign and are small and statistically insignificant, consistent with 
no effect.   
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Regression results: denial states 
Those who cannot purchase health insurance in the non-group market cannot benefit from 
tax deductions for non-group health insurance.  Therefore, pre-existing condition households 
should not respond to deductions at all in states in which they should be denied health insurance 
(prediction 2).  A test of this prediction is equal to the sign, statistical significance, and 
magnitude of the coefficient on GH: it should be equal in magnitude to G—the semi-elasticity of 
self-employment for non-pre-existing condition households—but have the opposite sign, such 
that G + GH = 0.  Evidence consistent with this prediction is provided in column two of Table 
2.4.  In it, GH is 0.665 (s.e.=0.391), almost exactly the same size as the coefficient on G (−0.654) 
but with the opposite sign.  These results imply that deductions increased self-employment by 36 
percent between 1999 and 2005 for non-pre-existing condition households (0.0107, s.e.=0.527).  
Although it is consistent with my theory, the estimated zero effect is imprecise.  The standard 
error implies I cannot rule out a ten percentage point increase in self-employment or a ten 
percentage point decrease in self-employment between 1999 and 2005.  The coefficient on the 
employed tax price has the correct sign and is small and statistically insignificant.     
 
Regression results: community-rated states 
Finally, column three of Table 2.4  investigates the effect of the tax prices on self-
employment in community-rated states.  My theory predicts that the semi-elasticities of self-
employment with respect to the self-employed tax price do not differ between the two types of 
households in these states.  A test of this prediction is equal to the statistical significance of GH.  
Although I find that GH = 0, the effect for non-pre-existing conditions households is small and 
statistically insignificant (−0.078, s.e.=0.634).  Taken together, these results imply that the semi-
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elasticity of self-employment with respect to the tax price is zero for both groups in community-
rated states.   
 
Robustness checks 
My main results use a narrow definition of pre-existing conditions, but more broad 
definitions also exist.  Table 2.5 reports my main results, re-estimated using the broad definition 
of pre-existing conditions.  Column one shows the results for risk-rated states.  My first 
prediction does not hold: the GH is not statistically different from zero (0.024, s.e.=0.0235), and 
the estimated semi-elasticities are about −0.45 for both types of households.  In terms of the 10 
percent decrease in the self-employed tax price, this effect implies a 25 percent increase in self-
employment between 1999 and 2005 for both groups.  The results for denial states in column two 
of Table 2.5 are qualitatively similar to the results using the narrow measure, but the semi-
elasticity of self-employment no longer differs significantly between the two types of households 
(0.182, s.e.=0.273).  The estimated semi-elasticity of self-employment with respect to the tax 
price for non-pre-existing condition households is −0.649 (s.e.=0.326)  and −0.467 (s.e.=0.409)  
for pre-existing condition households.  Although the interaction coefficient is not different from 
zero, I cannot reject that the effect among households with a pre-existing condition is zero.  
Column three illustrates the results for community-rated states.  The results are similar to those 
using the narrow definition of pre-existing conditions although the magnitude of the effect for 
non-pre-existing condition households doubles in size and switches signs.  It remains statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.    
Employer-sponsored health insurance through a spouse increases self-employment 
(Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates 2011).  Additionally, measurement error in the tax price is higher in 
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married households because married tax payers may file jointly or separately, but I do not 
observe their filing status.  An important robustness check therefore is to estimate the results 
separately for single households.  Column one of Table 2.6 shows the results from the replication 
results for single households.  The semi-elasticity of self-employment with respect to the tax 
price is statistically significant, and the magnitude is larger than the results using both married 
and single households.  This result suggests that the results are not driven by the availability of 
employer-sponsored insurance for one spouse.  Ideally, I would be able to estimate my main 
results on a sample of single households, but small sample size prevents me from doing so.  
Thirty-seven percent of the sample is single, and only nine percent of the single sample has a 
pre-existing condition.  This would result in very small cells when splitting the sample further by 
state non-group regulation type.  For this reason, I do not do this robustness check on the main 
results.   
The original PSID sample over-represents households that were low-income in 1967 
(Gouskova et al. 2008).  Although I control for current income in my results, the original 
selection procedure could introduce endogenous sampling if the error term is still correlated with 
self-employment after conditioning on current income.  However, if controlling for current 
income sufficiently removes variation related to 1967 income from the error term, weighting will 
increase the standard errors but not affect the estimated parameters (Solon, Haider, and 
Wooldridge 2013).  This is because weighted least squares is inefficient relative to ordinary least 
squares when the probability of being sampled is unrelated to the error term.  Columns two 
through four of Table 2.6 re-estimate the main results using the PSID’s longitudinal family 
weight.  The magnitudes and signs of the estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar, but the 
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standard errors are much larger.  These results suggest that my preferred specification without 
weights is acceptable.    
 
Discussion 
The results of this paper show that the effect of health insurance tax subsidies on self-
employment depends on both the presence of pre-existing conditions and the affordability and 
accessibility of coverage in the non-group market.  In states in which people with pre-existing 
conditions pay higher premiums for insurance, the effect of tax subsidies is twice as large among 
households with pre-existing conditions as those without.  In states in which pre-existing 
conditions are valid grounds for denial, households that contain a person with a pre-existing 
condition do not respond to tax subsidies at all.  Finally, in states in which people with pre-
existing conditions face the same premium as healthy people, tax subsidies have no effect on 
either group.   
This paper makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature and has 
a number of policy-relevant findings.  The paper’s theoretical contributions are three-fold.  First, 
I formalize the connection between non-group market regulations and tax policy through their 
combined effect on the after-tax price.  Previous work has only informally alluded to this 
relationship.  Second, the theory incorporates not just risk-rating but also the well-known feature 
of the non-group market that some individuals cannot obtain coverage at any price because of 
pre-existing conditions.  To the best of my knowledge, no paper in the literature on either tax 
deductions or non-group market reforms has explicitly studied the effect of both affordability of 
and access to coverage on self-employment.  Third, the paper illustrates the counterintuitive 
point that deductions should disproportionately benefit people with pre-existing conditions in 
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states in which risk-rated insurance is available.  This finding runs contrary to the idea that 
medical underwriting makes people with pre-existing conditions worse off. 
The paper makes four empirical contributions.  First, it is the first to estimate separate 
treatment effects of deduction on self-employment by the presence of a pre-existing condition as 
well as the affordability and accessibility of insurance in the non-group market.  Additionally, to 
the best of my knowledge, no other paper in the literature on non-group health insurance 
explicitly incorporates pre-existing conditions.  Second, it is the first paper in this literature to 
investigate the role of prohibitions on elimination riders in non-group markets.  Most papers 
have focused on community rating and guaranteed issue but this paper shows that the treatment 
of elimination riders matters for high-risk applicants in states in which elimination riders are 
prohibited but guaranteed issue is not required.  Although prohibiting elimination riders was 
likely meant to protect people with pre-existing conditions, the presence of this policy when 
insurers are not required to offer coverage to all applicants results in fewer coverage options.  
Third, this paper is the first in the literature on non-group market regulations or tax deductions to 
recognize that group-of-one states in which the self-employed can purchase insurance outside of 
the non-group market should be excluded from studies of the non-group market.  Including 
individuals from group-of-one states could overstate the effect of tax subsidies on self-
employment in denial or risk-rated states.  Fourth, the paper improves the synthetic tax price 
methodology because my instrument more adequately addresses simultaneity in the tax price of 
self-employment over time.  My first-stage results show that these synthetic tax price instruments 
are strong predictors of the endogenous tax prices, and my multivariate F-statistics indicate that 
concerns about weak instruments bias are negligible. 
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Finally, this paper contains four policy-relevant findings.  First, I show that job-lock 
affects self-employment for people with pre-existing conditions.  Policymakers have consistently 
referred to people with pre-existing conditions as the quintessential case for job lock 
(Government Accountability Office 2012b), yet little work explores the effect of high-cost 
medical conditions on employment outcomes.  Second, I provide evidence that the benefits of 
two decades of increased generosity in the tax code towards health insurance for the self-
employed accrued unevenly across health status and geography.  While people with high-risk 
health conditions benefited disproportionately in the majority of states, they did not benefit at all 
in states in which they were mostly likely to be denied health insurance.  Third, I show that tax 
subsidies and non-group market regulations interact.  This provides support for the ACA’s two-
pronged approach (tax subsidies and non-group market reforms) and casts doubt on recent 
proposals to repeal parts of the ACA or replace the ACA with tax-based subsidies alone (Collins, 
Kriss, and Fund 2008).  Additionally, it illustrates the importance of accounting for both types of 
policies in future evaluations of the ACA on self-employment.  Fourth, the results of this paper 
suggest that the ACA’s tax subsidies might not have an effect on self-employment, contrary to 
predictions by researchers and policymakers (Blumberg, Corlette, and Lucia 2013; Council of 
Economic Advisers 2009b; Government Accountability Office 2012b).  The ACA’s non-group 
market reforms establish community rating and guaranteed issue, and prohibit elimination riders 
and therefore, look most similar to community-rated states.  Note that, while these results show 
that tax subsidies do not have an effect on self-employment in community rated states, my results 
do not imply that community rating and guaranteed issue will not have a direct effect on self-
employment.   
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Conclusion 
Subsidizing health insurance for the self-employed through the tax code is a popular 
policy that has been shown to increase self-employment.  This paper shows that the effect of tax 
subsidies on self-employment depends on expected medical expenditures and the treatment of 
pre-existing conditions in the non-group insurance market.  Households that contain a person 
with a pre-existing condition respond more strongly to tax subsidies when they pay more for 
health insurance, but do not respond at all in states in which they would be denied health 
insurance because of a pre-existing condition.  Finally, neither type of household responds to 
health insurance tax subsidies in states in which the price of health insurance is not allowed to 
vary with health risk. 
  
 42 
 
Tables and figures 
Table 2.1 State non-group market classification 
State Type Nothing 
Guaranteed 
Issue 
Riders 
Prohibited 
Community-
Rating Totals 
Risk-Rated X 25 
X 2 
Denial X 5 
Community-
Rated X X X 6 
Not Appropriate 12 
Total 50 
The figure shows how the 50 states are classified into the three non-group market regulation 
types.  Risk-rated states are defined as those that have none of the three regulations (AL, AK, 
AZ, AR, GA, IL, IA, KS, LA, MO, MT, NE, NV, NM, ND, OH, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, 
WV, WI, WY) or guaranteed issue alone (PA, VA).  Denial states have prohibitions on 
elimination riders only (CA, ID, IN, MD, MN).  Community-rated states have all three 
regulations (ME, MA, NJ, NY, VT, WA).  States that allow the self-employed to purchase 
coverage in the small group market and have risk-rating in the non-group market are not 
included in the analysis (CO, CT, DE, FL, HI, MI, MS, NC, RI).  States that made changes to 
non-group market regulations between 1999 and 2005 were also omitted (KY, NH).  Finally, 
Oregon is excluded because it has community rating but does not require guaranteed issue.   
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Table 2.2 Panel Study of Income Dynamics Sample statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Self-Employment Measures  
  
Self-Employment in Main Job 0.180 0.392 
Key Independent Variables 
  
Self-Employed Tax Price 0.846 0.125 
Wage and Salary Tax Price 0.560 0.144 
Synthetic Self-Employed Tax Price 0.852 0.061 
Synthetic Wage and Salary Tax Price 0.564 0.054 
Pre-Existing Condition, Narrow Definition 0.117 0.322 
Pre-Existing Condition, Broad Definition 0.277 0.448 
State Non-Group Regulation Type 
  
Community-Rated 0.187 0.330 
Risk-Rated 0.596 0.491 
Denial 0.217 0.412 
Health Controls 
  
Head or Wife in Fair or Poor Health 0.140 0.347 
Head or Wife has a Work-Limiting Condition 0.166 0.372 
Head Weeks of Work Missed due to Illness 0.816 2.615 
Head or Wife is Sedentary 0.525 0.499 
Head or Wife is a Current Smoker 0.281 0.449 
Head or Wife is Obese 0.313 0.464 
Other Controls 
 
Age of Head 40.3 8.4 
Head is Married 0.630 0.483 
Head is Male 0.813 0.390 
Head or Wife is Non-White 0.250 0.433 
Head or Wife is College-Educated 0.591 0.492 
Total Number of Dependents 0.981 1.118 
Total Household Income 71426 120680 
Year 
  
1999 0.264 0.430 
2001 0.282 0.451 
2003 0.164 0.379 
2005 0.290 0.458 
The table provides sample means and standard deviations for the estimation sample which 
includes 12,385 household-year observations from 3,786 households with a working-age head 
(25-54) in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.   
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Table 2.3 Effect of tax prices on self-employment in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
 
Fixed Effects  
Fixed Effects 
and Health 
Controls 
ln(self-employed tax price) -0.374*** -0.360*** 
(0.135) (0.134) 
ln(employed tax price) 0.0728 0.0604 
(0.193) (0.190) 
Fair or Poor Health Status -0.0184* 
(0.0100) 
Limitations at Work 0.0122 
(0.0100) 
Weeks Missed Due to Own or Family Illness -0.000321 
(0.000976) 
Sedentary Lifestyle -0.00659 
(0.00635) 
Currently Smokes 0.00747 
(0.0119) 
Obese -0.00509 
(0.00968) 
Constant -0.182 -0.175 
(0.407) (0.414) 
Observations 12,385 12,385 
The table replicates results from the Heim and Lurie (2010) as in equation (5) with data from the 
PSID.  Self-employment is defined as self-reported, exclusive self-employment in the head or 
wife's main job.  Column 1 is estimated as in equation (5) with rudimentary demographic and 
income controls and fixed effects.  Column two adds time-varying health controls. All 
regressions are run on the full estimation sample of 38 states.  All regressions use 2-stage least 
squares with synthetic tax price instruments for both the self-employed and wage and salary tax 
prices.  The first stage F-statistics for the self-employed and employed tax prices are 56 and 70 
for column 1, and 49 and 66 for column 2.  Standard errors are clustered at the household level 
and are heteroskedasticity-robust.  * indicates statistically significant at the 10% level, ** 
indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and  *** indicates statistically significant at the 
1% level.
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Table 2.4 Heterogeneous effects of tax prices on self-employment by pre-existing conditions 
and state regulation type 
Risk-Rated 
States  
Denial 
States  
Community-
Rated States 
ln(self-employed tax price) -0.33* -0.65* -0.08 
[0.17] [0.34] [0.63] 
ln(employed tax price) 0.30 0.05 -0.87 
[0.19] [0.50] [0.65] 
ln(self-employed tax price) ×Condition -0.47** 0.67* 0.33 
[0.21] [0.39] [0.38] 
ln(employed tax price ) ×Condition 0.16 -0.52 0.51 
[0.20] [0.34] [0.64] 
Pre-Existing Condition -0.007 -0.15 0.40 
[0.092] [0.18] [0.44] 
Constant -0.15 -0.5 0.19 
[0.49] [1.1] [1.29] 
Observations 8,108 2,549 1,728 
The table reports regression coefficients from equation (6) for each type of state non-group 
regulatory environment, using the narrow definition of pre-existing conditions.  The estimation 
sample in column 1, is risk-rated states, column 2 is denial states and column 3 is community-
rated states. Self-employment is defined as self-reported exclusive self-employment in the head 
or the wife's main job.  The tax prices are interacted with narrow measures of pre-existing 
conditions defined in the text.  All regressions include demographic, income and health controls, 
as well as individual-level fixed effects.  All regressions use 2-stage least squares with synthetic 
tax price instruments for both the self-employed and wage and salary tax prices and their 
interactions.  First-stage results and multivariate F statistics are reported in appendix A. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level and are heteroskedasticity-robust. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.5 Heterogeneous effects of tax prices on self-employment by pre-existing conditions 
and state regulation type, alternative definition of pre-existing conditions 
  
Risk-Rated 
 
Denial 
 
Community 
Rated 
ln(self-employed tax price) -0.45*** -0.65** 0.15 
[0.17] [0.33] [0.49] 
ln(employed tax price) 0.35* 0.08 -0.71 
[0.20] [0.51] [0.56] 
ln(self-employed tax price) ×Condition 0.02 0.18 0.21 
[0.15] [0.270] [0.25] 
ln(employed tax price ) ×Condition 0.003 -0.020 -0.07 
[0.052] [0.095] [0.11] 
Pre-Existing Condition -0.027 0.023 -0.046 
[0.020] [0.034] [0.051] 
Constant -0.05 -0.3 0.08 
[0.50] [1.1] [1.20] 
Observations 8,108 2,549 1,728 
The table reports regression coefficients from equation (6) for each type of state non-group 
regulatory environment, using the broad definition of pre-existing conditions.  The estimation 
sample in column 1, is risk-rated states, column 2 is denial states and column 3 is community-
rated states. Self-employment is defined as self-reporting exclusive self-employment in the head 
or the wife's main job.  The tax prices are interacted with the broad measure of pre-existing 
conditions defined in the text.  All regressions include demographic, income and health controls 
as well as individual-level fixed effects.  All regressions use 2-stage least squares with synthetic 
tax price instruments for both the self-employed and wage and salary tax prices and their 
interactions.  First stage results and multivariate F statistics are reported in appendix A. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level and are heteroskedasticity-robust. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.6 Effect of tax prices on self-employment, robustness checks 
 
Single 
Households 
 
Weighted Results 
Risk-
Rated 
States  
Denial 
States  
Community-
Rated States 
ln(self-employed tax price) -0.51** -0.17 -1.03 0.17 
[0.23] [0.19] [0.89] [0.78] 
ln(employed tax price) 0.18 0.22 0.45 -0.48 
[0.25] [0.16] [0.52] [0.48] 
ln(self-employed tax price) × Condition -0.56* 0.67 0.05 
[0.29] [0.47] [0.29] 
ln(employed tax price ) × Condition 0.12 -0.58* 0.61 
[0.26] [0.34] [0.70] 
Pre-Existing Condition -0.06 -0.16 0.40 
[0.11] [0.22] [0.50] 
Observations 4,582 8,108 2,459 1,728 
The table reports results from robustness checks.  Column 1 presents the results from the 
replication for single households only and columns 2-4 present the results from the main 
regressions using the narrow definition of pre-existing conditions, weighting using the PSID 
family longitudinal weights.  All regressions include demographic, income and health controls as 
well as individual-level fixed effects.  All regressions use 2-stage least squares with synthetic tax 
price instruments for both the self-employed and wage and salary tax prices and their 
interactions.  Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are heteroskedasticity-
robust. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level.  
 
  
 48 
 
Figure 2.1 Federal and average state statutory health insurance deductions for the self-
employed and average self-employed tax price by state 
 
The figure shows the trend in statutory health insurance deductions at both the Federal and 
average state level for the period of analysis.  The figure also shows the average self-employed 
health insurance tax deduction in each state and each year of observation. 
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Figure 2.2 Heterogeneous trends in self-employment by the presence of a pre-existing 
condition and state non-group market regulation 
 
The figure shows the trend in self-employment for households that contain a person with a pre-
existing condition and those that do not in each type of non-group market regulatory 
environment.  The dotted lines represent the average self-employed tax price of health insurance 
for each group. 
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Table 2.7 First-stage regressions and multivariate F-statistics 
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Calculation of marginal tax rates 
The paper uses the methodology proposed by Butrica and Burkhauser (1997).  Because 
the PSID does not contain information on which family members constitute a tax filing unit, I 
assign individuals to tax units using the following rules (See directions for line 6c on the 1040: 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf):  
All married heads are assumed to file jointly with their wife  
All unmarried children of the head or wife (under age 19 or a full-time student between 
ages 19 and 24) and relatives of the head or wife without income are assumed to be dependents 
of the head. 
All other dwelling unit members who are not dependents are considered to be their own 
tax filing units.   
The analysis includes only the tax-unit to which the head belongs.  If the head is legally 
married, I assume his tax filing status is married, filing jointly.  If the head is single with 
dependents, I assume his tax filing status is single head of household.  If the head is single 
without dependents, the individual’s tax filing status is single. 
For the time period of this study, the PSID does not ask about whether individuals 
itemized or took the standard deduction.  For this reason, I assume that all individuals take the 
standard deduction.  This will produce conservative estimates of marginal tax rates because the 
self-employed are more likely to itemize so the marginal tax rate will be an upper bound 
(Therefore the tax price is a lower bound). 
The TAXSIM program uses 22 inputs to calculate marginal tax rates.  The following 
table shows the variables used to generate the inputs and their definitions:  
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Table 2.8 TAXSIM-Panel Study of Income Dynamics cross-walk 
Taxsim Input PSID Variables 
Caseid Family Identifier 
Tax Year Lagged Survey Year 
State Code PSID State Code 
Tax Filing Status Marital Status + Number of Dependents 
Dependent Exemptions Children of head or wife under age 19 or 
between 19 and 24 who are full-time students 
Number of Taxpayers Aged 65+ Number of household members aged 65+ 
Wage and Salary Income of Taxpayer Head Labor Income + Head Labor Income 
from Business 
Wage and Salary Income of Wife Wife Labor Income + Wife Labor Income 
from Business 
Dividend Income Dividend Income of the Head and Wife 
Other Property Income Head Asset Income from Business+ Wife 
Asset Income from Business+ Farm/Market 
Gardening Income + Alimony Received + 
Head Rent Income + Head and Wife Interest 
Income + Retirement Income- Alimony Paid 
Taxable Pensions Non-VA Retirement Income of Head + 
Retirement and Annuities Income of the Wife 
Gross Social Security Social Security Income of Family Unit 
Other Non-Taxable Transfer Income SSI Income of Head and Wife + VA Pension 
Income of Head + Workers Compensation 
Income of Head and Wife + TANF Income of 
Head and Wife + Other Welfare Income of 
Head and Wife + Child Support Income of 
Head and Wife 
Rent Paid Annual Rent Paid 
Property Taxes Paid Annual Property Tax Paid 
AMT-Preferred Itemized Deductions Itemized Charitable Deductions + Itemized 
Medical Deductions 
Child Care Expenses Annual Child Care Expenses Paid 
Unemployment Compensation Unemployment Income of Head and Wife 
Number of Dependents Aged Less Than 17 Number of children aged 16 and lower 
Non-AMT-Preferred Itemized Deductions Annual Mortgage Interest 
Short-Term Capital Gains  Assume zero 
Long-Term Capital Gains Assume zero 
 
For details about how TAXSIM calculates marginal tax rates, see (Feenberg and Coutts 
1993).  To create tax prices, I use several data sources.  I received the state-by-year statutory 
deduction amounts from Thomas Selden.  Table 2.9 shows the statutory deduction by state and 
year.  Note that 17 states adopt the Federal deduction in all years, and eight states do not have an 
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income tax during this period.  I get the federal fraction deductible from Heim and Lurie (2010).  
Table 2.10 displays these data. 
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Table 2.9 State statutory deduction fraction 
State 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CA 0.35 0.6 0.7 1 
GA 0.45 1 1 1 
IA 1 1 1 1 
ID 0.45 1 1 1 
IL 1 1 1 1 
MA 0.45 0.5 0.7 1 
ME 0 0.6 0.7 1 
MN 1 1 1 1 
MS 0 0.6 0.7 1 
MT 1 1 1 1 
NJ 0 0 0 0 
OH 1 1 1 1 
PA 0 0 0 0 
SC 1 1 1 1 
UT 0.6 1 1 1 
WI 1 1 1 1 
AK 1 1 1 1 
NV 1 1 1 1 
SD 1 1 1 1 
TN 1 1 1 1 
TX 1 1 1 1 
WA 1 1 1 1 
WY 1 1 1 1 
AL 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
AR 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
AZ 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
IN 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
KS 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
LA 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
MD 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
MO 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
ND 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
NE 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
NM 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
NY 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
OK 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
VA 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
VT 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
WV 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
DC 0.45 0.6 0.7 1 
Data come from Selden (2009).  Eight states do not have income tax during the period. 
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Table 2.10 Federal statutory deduction fraction 
Time Period Fraction 
Before 1986 0.00 
1986-1995 0.25 
1996 0.30 
1997 0.40 
1998 0.45 
1999-2001 0.60 
2002 0.70 
2003-present 1.00 
Data are presented in Heim and Lurie (2010)  
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Chapter 3 How do minimum medical loss ratio rules affect insurance markets?  
Historical evidence from Michigan 
 
For years, too many middle-class families saw their health care costs go up and up and 
up, without much explanation as to why or how their money was being spent.  But today, 
because of the Affordable Care Act, insurance companies have to spend at least 80 
percent of every dollar that you pay in premiums on your health care -- not on overhead, 
not on profits, but on you. Now, many insurance companies are… bringing down 
premiums and providing better value to their customers.   
--President Barack Obama (2013) 
 
Introduction 
The ratio of medical spending to premium revenue is called a medical loss ratio (MLR).  
In an effort to reduce premiums and promote value in health spending, the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) establishes a minimum medical loss ratio rule in health insurance markets.  The new rule 
requires insurers to spend at least 80 percent (and 85 percent for large group plans) of premium 
revenue on medical care or quality improvement activities, limiting the share that goes to 
administrative expenses and profits to no more than 20 percent.  If insurers do not meet the 
minimum, they must issue a rebate to consumers.  Policymakers argue that the minimum MLR 
rule will benefit consumers by encouraging insurers to reduce premiums in order to comply with 
the law (Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight 2012b, 2012a).  
However, the minimum MLR rule creates complex incentives for insurers, some of which 
could reduce consumer welfare.  Harrington (2013) argues that insurers with MLRs above the 
minimum might increase premiums in order to compensate for the risk of paying a rebate when 
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medical care expenditures are lower than expected.  The rule could increase market 
concentration and reduce choice for consumers if insurers have to exit the market because they 
cannot comply with the rule (Harrington 2013).  Consumers could also face fewer choices if 
insurers exit state health insurance markets where it is relatively more difficult to meet the MLR 
requirements because of state taxes and licensing fees (Kirchhoff and Mulvey 2012).  The 
minimum MLR rule could exacerbate wasteful spending if insurers comply with the rule by 
increasing expenditures on medical care or quality improvements that are not valued by 
consumers.   
Finally a potentially important, but as yet unstudied, unintended consequence of the law 
is that it could facilitate tacit collusion, resulting in lower MLRs.  The minimum MLR rule 
establishes a mandated floor for the MLR that aims to cap the price of insurance for a given level 
of benefit payments.  Because this limits the price of health insurance, the premium, it is similar 
to a price ceiling.  Knittel and Stango (2003), as well as Ma (2007) show that the establishment 
of a price ceiling can result in prices below the ceiling but above what would be the equilibrium 
price in an unregulated market. 
The probable impact of the ACA’s minimum MLR rule is an open question.  This paper 
provides evidence that minimum MLR regulations can result in aggregate reductions in the 
MLR, consistent with tacit collusion.  I use the introduction of a similar rule in Michigan in 1974 
to measure the effect of this type of policy on MLRs.  I outline a conceptual framework that 
illustrates how minimum MLR rules can result in tacit collusion and why the MLR may fall 
among for-profit insurers as a result.  Then I estimate the effect of the rule on Michigan’s for-
profit insurers using state-level data on average insurer MLRs from the Health Insurance 
Association of America member surveys.  The results suggest that the average MLR fell by at 
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least six percentage points among for-profit insurers in Michigan as a result of the rule.  I find 
suggestive evidence that the reduction in average MLRs resulted through an increase in 
premiums. 
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on health insurance regulation, as well as 
the rapidly growing literature on the ACA’s minimum MLR rule.  Karaca-Mandic et al. (2013) 
show that insurers in highly concentrated markets have lower MLRs.  Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, 
and Phelps (2011) use data from the decade before the introduction of the ACA rule to predict its 
effect on insurers.  McCue and Hall (2012), McCue, Hall, and Liu (2013), and Abraham, Karaca-
Mandic, and Simon (2014) use data from 2010 and 2011 to estimate the effect of the ACA’s rule 
on MLRs and their components in the first year.  These early evaluations of the ACA’s minimum 
MLR rule generally find that, in its first year, the rule had little effect on group market insurers’ 
MLRs but increased MLRs among some individual market insurers.  These increases in the MLR 
appear to be driven by for-profit insurers (McCue, Hall, and Liu 2013) and insurers that were 
initially below the threshold.  Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Simon (2014) find that insurers 
with pre-rule MLRs more than 10 percent below the minimum increased their MLRs, but 
insurers with pre-rule MLRs more than 10 percent above the minimum decreased their MLRs.   
There are three challenges that might limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the 
effects of the ACA’s minimum MLR rule.  First, the ACA’s rule has only been in effect since 
2011, and the administrative data are only available after several years (National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, personal communication 2013).  Therefore it will not be possible to 
estimate longer-term effects of the rule for at least several years.  Second, the ACA’s rule alters 
the definition of an MLR from the traditional one, requiring new information not previously 
recorded in administrative data.  This limits the pre-period for evaluation of the ACA’s minimum 
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MLR rule to one year (Karaca-Mandic et al. 2013).  Third, it is difficult to find control groups 
for an evaluation of the rule because the ACA establishes a national policy that applies to nearly 
all insurers.  Without a control group, reductions in the MLR due to the rule cannot be 
distinguished from secular trends.  I attempt to address all three challenges by focusing on one 
state’s minimum MLR rule, which was implemented in the 1970s.  Because the rule took effect 
several decades ago and uses the traditional definition of an MLR, I have many more years of 
pre- and post-rule data.  And because the rule only affected one state, I can exploit both political 
boundaries and program features as controls.  
 
The policy 
In 1974, Michigan became one of the first states to implement a minimum MLR rule 
(America's Health Insurance Plans 2010).  At the time, insurers in Michigan were required to 
submit proposed insurance rates to the insurance commissioner the year before the plan was to 
be offered (P. Austin, personal communication 2013).  In 1974, Michigan’s administrative code 
was amended to require all insurance companies selling individual or group health insurance 
policies to include in their annual rate filing “an actuarial certification that the medical care 
payments provided are reasonable in relation to the premium charged and [that] shall show the 
anticipated loss ratio” (Michigan Compiled Laws).   
As defined by the Michigan rule, the MLR is the ratio of expected medical care payments 
to expected premium revenues, adjusted for any part of the premium that was returned to 
beneficiaries.  Because insurers must demonstrate that plans to be sold in the next calendar year 
meet the rule’s requirements, the MLR for the purposes of the policy is a prediction based on 
past data (Michigan Compiled Laws).  Equation (1) is an expression for the MLR: 
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(1) STU=VW = XYZ+([\])^	_[\]XY"+([\])^	_[\] 
STU=VW is the MLR in Michigan at time t.  I`a	(=)is the present value of benefits, 
defined as medical care payments, the year before the insurance plan is offered.  I`	(=) is the 
present value of premiums the year before the plan is offered.  Present value is defined as the 
value today of an amount of money in the future.  Because health insurance contracts are written 
on a yearly basis, the present value of premiums or benefits is the expected premium in year t, 
the year the plan will be sold, discounted back one year to year t-1, the year the plan is submitted 
to the insurance commissioner.  b6E=are any payments returned to plan beneficiaries by 
insurer i, called dividends.  Because insurance is typically offered on a yearly basis, such 
dividends are rare.  Equation (1) means that the MLR submitted to the Michigan insurance 
department is a predicted MLR for next year based on data from this year or last year with 
payments and premium revenue expressed in today’s dollars.   
According to the law passed in 1974, any MLR below 65 percent for group insurance or 
55 percent for individual insurance is considered “unreasonable,” and the insurer is not allowed 
to sell the proposed plan in Michigan (Michigan Compiled Laws).  In addition, approval was 
withdrawn on September 30th, 1974 for all insurance plans that were approved for sale in 1975 if 
they did not meet the new requirements (Michigan Compiled Laws).  Thus, insurers were 
prevented from offering coverage in 1975 that did not comply with the law. 
 
Conceptual framework 
Health insurance markets are characterized by high market concentration (Harrington 
2013; Dafny 2010).  In a setting with few sellers, the decisions of one insurer can depend on 
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those of others in the market.  All things being equal, profit-maximizing insurers should seek to 
minimize MLRs, but insurance plans with relatively low MLRs may lose market share to plans 
with higher MLRs if people select their insurance plans based on the MLR or related 
characteristics such as actuarial value.  If insurers could collude to offer insurance with a cost-
minimizing MLR, they could enjoy higher profits.   
In the absence of a minimum MLR rule, insurers would be unlikely to collude on MLRs 
for two reasons.  First, explicit collusion is illegal, and tacit collusion—choosing the same MLR 
without explicitly communicating—is difficult to coordinate.  Second, even if insurers were able 
to collude, maintaining the colluding equilibrium would be difficult because it is costly: each 
insurer could temporarily capture market share and increase profits by deviating from the 
equilibrium.    
Establishment of a minimum MLR rule should change health insurance markets in two 
ways that facilitate tacit collusion, which could therefore result in lower MLRs.  First, a 
minimum MLR rule creates a mandated floor that can serve as a focal point (Schelling 1960), 
defined as a natural or obvious price such as a regulatory ceiling or floor.  When firms can set 
prices but cannot explicitly collude, they may cluster around a focal point.  Knittel and Stango 
(2003), as well as Ma (2007) show that this occurs with price ceilings.  Focal points allow tacit 
collusion, which can be stable over time (Eckert 2004; Leufkens and Peeters 2011).  Second, a 
minimum MLR rule reduces the costs of tacit collusion by removing asymmetric information 
between insurers.  The rule requires insurers to report MLRs to insurance commissioners each 
year, making MLRs effectively public through official processes such as the Freedom of 
Information Act (Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services, personal 
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communication,).  Lowering the cost of collusion helps make the colluding equilibrium more 
stable over time.   
If firms tacitly collude on MLRs, the result is an MLR that is lower than it would in an 
unregulated equilibrium.  If the unregulated MLR exceeds the new minimum mandated MLR, 
the MLRs of for-profit insurers should decrease toward the focal point.  To test for tacit 
collusion, I need to observe the distribution of insurers’ MLRs, which requires insurer-level data.  
Unfortunately, only state-level data are available.  Therefore, I cannot test for tacit collusion 
directly.  However, I can look for evidence consistent with tacit collusion using aggregate data.  
Aggregate data are state-level, enrollment-weighted averages of commercial (for-profit) and 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield (non-profit) insurance plans in the market.  If most people are 
enrolled in plans with MLRs above the minimum, and insurers that sell these plans reduce their 
MLRs in response to the policy, then aggregate MLRs will also fall.  However, if most people 
are enrolled in plans with MLRs below the minimum that must increase their MLRs in response 
to the policy, aggregate MLRs may not fall, even if insurers with MLRs above the minimum still 
reduce their MLRs.  To summarize, I hypothesize that for-profit insurers’ MLRs will fall as a 
result of the rule (hypothesis 1).  
The conceptual framework outlined above describes the behavior of profit-maximizing 
firms.  However, Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) insurers may not be affected by the rule in 
the same way because they might not have the same incentives to minimize the MLR.  
Additionally, the MLRs of non-profit insurers are quite high, averaging over 90 percent, so no 
BCBS insurers are likely to be forced to comply with the law.  Therefore, I hypothesize that non-
profit insurers’ MLRs will not be affected by the rule (hypothesis 2).  
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Data 
Dataset 
The ideal dataset for evaluating Michigan’s minimum MLR rule would have observations 
at the insurer-level from each state.  Unfortunately, such data are unavailable.  State-by-year data 
are less useful because they do not allow me to estimate the effect of the rule separately for 
insurers with low pre-rule MLRs versus those with high pre-rule MLRs.  Separating these effects 
is important because insurers below the minimum must increase their MLRs in order to continue 
operating in Michigan, but insurers above the minimum could reduce their MLRs to the 
minimum (Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Simon 2014).  Instead, I am only able to estimate an 
effect on the average MLR among insurers in that state.  This average will be affected by the 
share of the health insurance market that is enrolled in low or high pre-rule MLR plans and the 
size of the effect for each type of insurer.   
To estimate the effect of a minimum MLR rule on MLRs, I construct a dataset of state-
level premium revenue and total benefit payments for commercial and BCBS insurers for each 
year between 1969 and 1980 using Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) 
Sourcebook of Health Insurance Information reports (Health Insurance Association of 1959-
1980).  The reports contain state-by-year statistics from HIAA member surveys, which gather 
information on operations from all insurance companies offering group, or individual accident 
and health insurance policies.  In 1966, HIAA’s sample represented 99 percent of membership in 
commercial insurance plans in the group market, and 83 percent of membership in commercial 
insurance plans in the individual market (Reed 1967).  The surveys did not sample BCBS 
insurers.  Information on premiums and benefits for BCBS plans come from the National 
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Association of Blue Shield Plans and the Blue Cross Association (Reed 1967) and were 
republished by HIAA in the Sourcebook of Health Insurance reports.  From these data, I 
calculate state-by-year MLRs for commercial and BCBS insurers, defined as total benefit 
payments divided by aggregate premium revenue. 
 I supplement my dataset with population estimates from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, 
and End Results Program.  From these data, I obtain estimates of total state population, elderly 
population (65+), working age population (20-64), and the fraction of the population that is 
female (Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results Program 1969-2012).  I also include 
estimates of state per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 1969-1980) and measures of the size of the state’s hospital and surgical 
insurance markets in thousands of covered lives from the HIAA member surveys.  These 
covariates partially control for differences in health insurance and medical care demand between 
states, over time.  Descriptive statistics for the sample can be found in the appendix (Table 3.7).  
 
Descriptive Trends 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the trend in MLRs and the timing of the Michigan rule.  Because the 
rule requires insurers to obtain certification in the calendar year before the plan is sold, a change 
in forecasted MLRs that took place in 1974 did not affect actual MLRs until 1975.  Similarly, if 
insurers did not anticipate the rule, any response to the rule would not be observable until 1976 
or later. The left panel of the figure illustrates the trend in MLRs for commercial insurers.  
Although average MLRs are higher before 1976, the trend in Michigan looks similar to the rest 
of the United States, but the level is much higher.  After 1976, however, the average MLR rises 
in the rest of the United States yet remains constant in Michigan.  This suggests that Michigan’s 
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commercial insurers diverged from prevailing trends.  The right panel of the figure is noisy but 
shows no clear trend in the MLR for BCBS insurers.  
Table 3.1 presents the data in Figure 3.1 in terms of simple, unadjusted means of the 
MLR and its components.  The table divides the data into Michigan and the rest of the United 
States, before and after the rule took effect, providing a simple difference-in-differences 
estimate.  Michigan’s commercial MLR did not change between the pre- and post-periods (80%).  
Without a control group, it would appear that the rule had no effect.  However, MLRs in the rest 
of the country rose faster, from 71 to 78 percent between the pre- and post-periods (6p.p.).  If the 
rest of the United States can serve as a counterfactual for Michigan had the minimum MLR rule 
not been adopted, Table 3.1 implies that Michigan’s commercial MLR actually fell (-6p.p.).  
BCBS loss ratios remained high (93-94%) in both Michigan and the United States, before and 
after the rule took effect, suggesting no change.      
Aggregate premiums increased among commercial insurers in Michigan after the policy 
($21,000), but they increased less in the rest of the United States ($9,000).  Comparing these two 
differences suggests that premiums increased by $12,000 as a result of the rule.  I observe a 
similar pattern for total benefit payments, although the implied effect is smaller; total benefit 
payments only increased by $6,000.  For Michigan’s BCBS insurer, aggregate premiums and 
benefits both increased relative to the rest of the United States after the policy took effect, but 
premiums and benefits increased by a similar amount ($55,000).   
 
Estimation strategy 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of a minimum MLR rule in Michigan 
on insurer MLRs and their components, comparing trends in Michigan to a plausible 
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counterfactual.  I use a difference-in-differences strategy, comparing the change in the MLR in 
Michigan before and after 1976, to the change in the rest of the United States.  Table 3.1presents 
difference-in-differences estimates in terms of unadjusted means, but static or time-varying 
differences between states, as well as secular trends in the MLR and its components may 
confound the simple estimates.  To control for potential confounding factors, I estimate the 
following multivariate regression: 
 
(2) c=. = G? + GSd +	GBIe;f= + GH(Sd × Ie;f)= + DC= + &= + g + F=  
 
c=. denotes the state-level MLR for insurers of type m—where m is either commercial or 
BCBS—in state s at time t.  In alternate regressions, c=. denotes the aggregate components of 
the MLR: state-level premium revenue or state-level total benefit payments.  Sd is an indicator 
set to one if the observation comes from the state of Michigan, and Ie;f= indicates that the 
observation comes from 1976 or later—the first year the rule would have affected MLRs.  The 
parameter GH gives the effect of the rule on MLRs in Michigan. 
To control for differences in the characteristics of health insurance markets, I add time-
varying state-level controls, C=.  These controls include factors that affect the demand for health 
insurance and health care, such as per capita income and the age and sex distribution of the 
population.  In select specifications, I also include the size of the hospital and surgical insurance 
markets in thousands of covered lives.  In all models, I include year and state fixed effects &=, g 
to control for time-invariant state characteristics and common trends in the MLR over time.  All 
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regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, clustered at the state level. 
Unobserved state-level factors that are not captured by state-specific linear time trends 
could threaten the internal validity of my difference-in-differences design.  For example, changes 
in economic conditions specific to Michigan could affect the MLR and bias estimates of GH.  To 
control for this type of confounding factor, I also employ a triple-difference estimator with a 
within-state control group, according to equation (3): 
(3)c.= = >? + >Sd +	>BIe;f= + >HJeSS. + >K(Sd × Ie;f)= + >O(Sd ×
JeSS). + >h(Ie;f × JeSS)=. + >i(Sd × Ie;f × JeSS)=. + DC= + &= + g + =. 
 
JeSS. indicates that the observation is from commercial insurers rather than BCBS 
insurers.  The parameter >i is the coefficient on the triple interaction and gives the change in 
commercial MLRs after the rule, between Michigan and the rest of the United States, using the 
change in BCBS insurer MLRs relative to the rest of the United States as a control group.  
The estimation sample includes 11 years of data (1969-1980) from the contiguous United 
States, excluding two states: Pennsylvania and Tennessee.  These states enacted their own 
minimum MLR rules in 1975 and 1974 respectively (America's Health Insurance Plans 2010).  I 
omit Tennessee because the state had a policy similar to a minimum MLR rule dating as far back 
as 1945 (America's Health Insurance Plans 2010).  I omit Pennsylvania because it yields 
relatively fewer post-period observations than the rest of the states.  Regressions that include 
controls for the size of the insurance market do not include data from the years 1968, 1978, or 
1980 because information on the size of the insurance market is unavailable. 
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One potential problem with the estimates is that they may also be influenced by outliers.  
Figure 2.2 shows MLRs for both the commercial and BCBS markets, with dashed lines 
indicating zero and one.  Over the study period, 45 observations have an MLR that exceeds one.  
Because premium revenue must cover both benefit costs and administrative costs, in expectation 
the MLR should be bounded from above by one.  Observations may exceed one if insurers 
under-predict the cost of reimbursing medical care.  To address outliers, I use robust regression.  
Robust regression uses Cook’s D statistic to remove influential outliers from the sample and then 
re-weights the remaining observations to calculate an unbiased ordinary least squares estimate 
(Berk 1990).   
Another problem with the estimates is that there is only one treated group.  When the 
number of treated groups is small, the standard asymptotics do not apply, and the standard errors 
will be incorrect (Donald and Lang 2007; Conley and Taber 2011).  To address this problem, I 
follow Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta (2011) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 
(2010) in using a version of Fisher (1935) permutation test to generate more conservative 
confidence intervals for the estimates.  I estimate equation (2) and equation (3) 47 times, 
replacing the treatment state with each state in the sample.  This allows me to estimate 46 
placebo effects and one estimate of the treatment effect for Michigan.  I then use the estimates to 
approximate the sampling distribution of the treatment effect.  If the treatment effect using 
Michigan is significant at the five percent (10%) level, it will rank in the top or bottom 2.5 
percent (5%) of the distribution. 
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Results 
Michigan’s Commercial MLR fell relative to the rest of the United States 
My research strategy compares the change in MLRs in Michigan before and after the rule 
to the change in the rest of the United States, as in equation (2).  Table 3.2 shows that MLRs fell 
by seven percentage points (s.e.=0.0082) in a model with state and year fixed effects, as well as 
state-level demographic and income controls (column 1).  Adding controls for the size of the 
health insurance market (column 2), the effect increases to eight percentage points (s.e.=0.0092).  
Relative to the average MLR among commercial insurers before the minimum MLR rule (80%), 
this point estimate represents an 8-10 percent decrease, in keeping with hypothesis one. 
Few of the controls are significant.  As expected, the coefficient on the Michigan dummy 
is both positive and statistically significant because the average MLR among Michigan’s 
commercial insurers is higher than that of insurers in the rest of the nation, as shown in Figure 
3.1 and Table 3.1.  Additionally, the post-1975 dummy is positive and statistically significant 
because MLRs are rising over the period.   
These results should be interpreted with caution.  First, the presence of outliers could 
influence the results.  In order to reduce this possibility, I re-estimate equation (2) using robust 
regression.  The results are similar in magnitude to the ordinary least squares estimates, but the 
standard errors are larger.  In a model with state and year fixed effects and state-level 
demographic and income controls (column 3), Michigan’s commercial MLR fell by about six 
percentage points (s.e.=0.022).  Adding controls for the size of the hospital and surgical 
insurance markets (column 4), the reduction increases to seven percentage points (s.e.=0.026).  
In terms of a proportional reduction, these point estimates represent about a nine percent 
decrease. 
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Secondly, the standard errors, even allowing arbitrary correlation in the error terms 
between observations from the same state, may be incorrect because there is only one treated 
unit.  In order to provide more conservative estimates, I use the permutation test, as described 
above.  Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the treatment and placebo effects.  Michigan’s point 
estimate of -0.07925 percentage points ranks in the bottom 5th percentile of the distribution, 
making it statistically significant at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test. 
 
Michigan’s BCBS MLR was unaffected 
Figure 3.1 suggests that Michigan’s BCBS insurers were unaffected by the rule, and 
Table 3.3 provides support for this observation.  Controlling for state and year fixed effects as 
well as state-level income, and demographic factors, Michigan’s BCBS MLR increased by a 
statistically insignificant one percentage point (s.e.=0.024).  Adding controls for the size of the 
health insurance market, the effect falls by an order of magnitude to 0.1 percentage points 
(s.e.=0.0174).  The results are similar adjusting for outliers using robust regression (columns 3-
4).  Together, these results suggest that BCBS MLRs were unaffected, in keeping with 
hypothesis two. 
 
Michigan’s commercial MLR fell relative to the rest of the United States and to BCBS 
insurers 
A potential threat to my difference-in-differences estimates is that there could be time-
varying, state-level confounding factors that affect Michigan differently than the rest of the 
United States.  One way to control for such threats is to use a within-state control group that 
would also be affected by such time-varying factors but not by the treatment.  Because 
Michigan’s BCBS insurers were likely subject to similar health insurance demand and regulatory 
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and economic conditions but were unaffected by the rule, they can serve as a within-state control 
group for commercial insurers.  Table 3.4 presents the results from regressions specified in 
equation (3).  The coefficient of interest is the triple interaction, which gives the difference in the 
difference-in-differences estimates presented in Table 3.2.  The interaction coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant, meaning that commercial MLRs fell as a result of the rule.  
Controlling for state and year fixed effects and state-level income and demographic controls 
(column 1), Michigan’s commercial MLR fell by eight percentage points (s.e.=0.0129).  The 
results are robust to the inclusion of controls for the size of the health insurance market (column 
2).  In terms of the pre-rule MLR among Michigan’s commercial insurers (80%), these point 
estimates imply a 10 percent decrease in the MLR after the rule took effect.  Adjusting for 
potential outliers with robust regression, the size of the standard errors increases, but the 
magnitude of the effect remains unchanged.  The results of the permutation test are displayed in 
Figure 3.4; Michigan’s point estimate of -0.0819 ranks in the 6th percentile of the distribution of 
state effects and is therefore only marginally statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Premiums increased disproportionately among Michigan’s commercial and BCBS insurers 
Because the MLR is the ratio of benefits to premiums, the estimated reduction in the 
MLR for commercial insurers could arise as a result of a disproportionate increase in premiums 
or a disproportionate decrease in total benefits.  To investigate this issue, I examine the effect of 
the rule on premiums and benefits separately.  
Figure 3.5 provides descriptive premium revenue and benefit payment trends for 
Michigan and the rest of the United States, for both commercial and BCBS insurers.  Although 
the level is higher in Michigan, benefit payments and premium revenue before the rule took 
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effect appear to rise at the same rate as in the rest of the United States.  After the rule, however, 
both commercial benefit payments and premium revenue appear to have increased slightly, but 
premium revenue growth slightly outpaced benefit payment growth.  Among Michigan’s BCBS 
insurers, both the level and the rate of premium revenue growth are greater than those in the rest 
of the United States.  While benefit payments and premium revenue are rising non-
monotonically, there appears to be no trend break at 1976 for benefit payments and a slight trend 
break at 1976 for premium revenue.  This suggests that BCBS insurers might have also been 
affected by the rule, and therefore should not be used as a within-state control group for 
Michigan’s commercial insurers. 
To test whether premiums or benefits payments for Michigan’s commercial and BCBS 
insurers were affected by the rule, I re-estimate equation (2) using state-level premium revenue 
and benefit payments for each type of insurer as the dependent variable.  Table 3.5 presents the 
results for commercial and BCBS premium revenue for my preferred specification with the full 
set of controls.  For differences-in-differences, I find that commercial premium revenue rose by 
$13,800 (s.e.=$1,800) using ordinary least squares (column 1), and nearly $10,000 (s.e.=$2,000) 
using robust regression (column 2).  As a fraction of Michigan’s pre-rule commercial premium 
revenue ($129,000), this effect represents a 7-11 percent increase.     
As Figure 3.5 suggests, BCBS premiums increased in Michigan relative to the rest of the 
United States.  The estimated increase is about $16,000 (s.e.=$2,100) using ordinary least 
squares (column 3) or robust regression (s.e.=$2,200, column 4).  As a fraction of Michigan’s 
BCBS MLR before the rule took effect ($180,000), the effect represents a statistically significant 
nine percent increase.  This result casts doubt on the use of BCBS insurers as a control in triple-
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difference estimates.  Therefore, I do not re-estimate equation (3) using the components of the 
MLR as dependent variables.    
Table 3.6 presents the results for commercial and BCBS aggregate benefit payments.  
Estimating the effect using differences-in-differences by ordinary least squares (column 1), I find 
that benefits increased by $8,300 (s.e.=$2,000), but the effect becomes small and statistically 
insignificant at the five-percent level using robust regression ($2,800, s.e.=$1,700, column 2).  
Scaled by aggregate benefit payments among Michigan’s commercial insurers before the rule 
took effect ($103,000), the ordinary least squares estimate implies an eight percent increase in 
benefit payments, while the robust regression estimates imply no change.  Among BCBS 
insurers, the point estimates suggest that benefits increased by $15,100 (s.e.=$1,500) using 
ordinary least squares (column 3) and did not increase at all using robust regression ($1,400, 
s.e.=$1,600, column 4).   
Figure 3.6 applies the multiple permutation test to the difference-in-difference results for 
commercial premiums and benefits.  Relative to the 46 placebo effects provided by other states 
in the sample, Michigan’s estimated effect is not statistically significant for either premiums or 
benefits.   
Taken together, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 suggest that premium revenue increased among 
commercial and BCBS insurers, but aggregate benefit payments may not have changed.  The 
estimated increases in premium revenue for both commercial and BCBS insurers are 
proportionally similar, suggesting that the law could have affected both types of insurers.  
Although the estimated increase in premium revenue survives robust regression, it does not 
survive the multiple permutation test.     
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Discussion 
The findings of this paper suggest that the establishment of a minimum MLR rule can 
result in unintended consequences.  The introduction of such a rule in Michigan resulted in at 
least a six percentage point decrease in MLRs among for-profit commercial insurers relative to 
the rest of the United States.  My preferred specification suggests that the reduction in MLRs 
was driven by a disproportionate increase in premium revenue. 
Although I cannot explicitly test for it, the results are consistent with tacit collusion, a 
potentially important implication of price regulation previously unstudied in the context of 
minimum MLR regulations.  Establishment of a mandated minimum MLR creates a focal point 
in the market for health insurance.  Such focal points could facilitate tacit collusion by providing 
a natural or obvious price that serves as a coordination target for firms in the absence of explicit 
collusion (Knittel and Stango 2003; Ma 2007).   
In order to make generalizations from the effects in Michigan to the ACA’s minimum 
MLR rule, it is important to compare the two rules.  Michigan’s rule differs from the ACA’s 
minimum MLR rule in two ways.  First, the ACA’s rule is based on actual MLRs, while the 
Michigan rule is based on predicted MLRs.  If actual and predicted MLRs differ systematically, 
Michigan’s rule could be more or less binding than the ACA’s.  Second, the ACA modifies the 
definition of an MLR.  The numerator of the ratio includes not only medical care reimbursement 
but also expenditures on quality improvement activities such as wellness or health promotion 
programs (Kirchhoff and Mulvey 2012).  The denominator is also modified; it is defined as 
premium revenue less state taxes and regulatory fees.     
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Despite these definitional differences, Michigan’s minimum MLR rule resembles the 
ACA’s rule in several ways that should affect the actions of insurers.  Both establish a minimum 
MLR that applies nearly universally, and the relative stringency of the minimum is similar; both 
rules have minimums that are 5-10 percentage points lower than the average prevailing loss ratio 
(America's Health Insurance Plans 2011; Harrington 2013).  Both rules also have an enforcement 
mechanism; under the ACA, insurers must pay a rebate if their MLRs fall below the minimum, 
while, under Michigan’s rule, insurers are forbidden from offering plans that do not meet the 
requirements.  Most importantly for generalization of these results to the ACA, both rules 
contain features that facilitate tacit collusion.  First, the ACA’s mandated minimum can serve as 
a focal point.  Second, the law’s explicit public reporting requirements for MLRs should reduce 
information asymmetries between insurers more than Michigan’s rule does, thus further lowering 
the cost of maintaining a colluding equilibrium over time. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on minimum MLR rules.  It 
is the first to use an individual state’s minimum MLR rule to evaluate the effect of such a policy.  
Although over 30 states had such rules at the time of the passage of the ACA (America's Health 
Insurance Plans 2010), the effect of this type of rule on state insurance markets had never been 
estimated.  Previous natural experiments provide a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of 
minimum MLR rules, given the lack of straightforward control groups under the ACA.  I find 
that a control group, in this case, the rest of the United States, is important; without one, I would 
have concluded that Michigan’s minimum MLR rule resulted in higher MLRs.   
The paper has several limitations.  First, because the data are aggregated to the state level, 
it is not possible to accurately measure individual insurers’ response to the policy.  In theory, 
commercial MLRs could also fall if people with higher health expenditures switch from 
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commercial insurance to BCBS plans because they have a higher MLR. The remaining 
individuals who purchase commercial insurance could be less costly, and therefore medical care 
reimbursements would temporarily fall as a result of selection rather than insurers’ response to 
the minimum MLR rule.  This is likely not a significant problem because I detect no change in 
the BCBS MLR.  Second, I am unable to control for market concentration because these data are 
not readily available for this period.  Karaca-Mandic et al. (2013)show that more concentrated 
markets have lower MLRs, so within-state changes in market structure that are not eliminated in 
the triple-difference specification could affect the results.  It is unclear how omission would bias 
the estimated effects.  Finally, I estimate triple-difference models using non-profit BCBS 
insurers as a control group for commercial insurers because I predict that they should not be 
affected by the policy.  In fact, my results suggest that premiums were affected, and therefore 
BCBS insurers should not serve as a control group for commercial insurers.  Fortunately, this 
does not change the conclusion of the paper, because the difference-in-difference and triple 
difference results tell the same story.   
 
Conclusion 
The ACA establishes a minimum MLR rule, yet very little is known about its likely effect 
on insurance markets.  This paper uses the adoption of a minimum MLR rule in Michigan to 
show that such rules can result in lower MLRs, potentially as a result of tacit collusion.  If the 
results from this paper can be generalized to today, this paper has an important policy-relevant 
conclusion: the establishment of a minimum MLR rule could result in a reduction in some 
insurers’ MLRs. As a result, policymakers should be as worried about maintaining the MLRs of 
insurers above the minimum as they are with increasing loss ratios of those below it. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1 Trends in the medical loss ratio: commercial and Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
insurers 
 
The figure plots the average state-level medical loss ratio for commercial (left panel) and Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield (right panel) insurers in Michigan (triangles) and the rest of the United 
States (circles).  The data come from Health Insurance Association of America surveys and Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield Association surveys.  The vertical line marks 1976, the first year in which 
health insurance plans would have been affected by insurers’ response to the policy.     
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Figure 3.2 Medical loss ratio outliers 
The figure plots the raw data for the estimation sample.  Each point represents a state-level MLR 
for either commercial (black) or Blue Cross and Blue Shield (gray) insurers.  The dashed 
horizontal lines mark 1 and 0, the bounds for the MLR.  
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Figure 3.3 State difference-in-difference effects: commercial medical loss ratios 
The figure plots the distribution of difference-in-differences estimates (eq(3)) using each state in 
the estimation sample (N=47) as the control group.  All estimates are obtained using ordinary 
least squares and include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state population, the 
age and sex distribution of the population, and the size of the health insurance market. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.  The dashed vertical lines mark the 5th and 95th percentiles.  
The black vertical line marks the effect for Michigan.   
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Figure 3.4 State triple difference effects: commercial medical loss ratios 
The figure plots the distribution of triple difference estimates (eq(4)) using each state in the 
estimation sample (N=47) as the control group.  All estimates are obtained using ordinary least 
squares and include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state population, the age 
and sex distribution of the population, and the size of the health insurance market. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.  The dashed vertical lines mark the 5th and 95th percentiles.  
The black vertical line marks the effect for Michigan.   
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Figure 3.5 Trends in premiums and benefits: commercial and Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
insurers 
The figure plots the average state-level components of the medical loss ratio for commercial (top 
panel) and Blue Cross and Blue Shield (bottom panel) insurers in Michigan (triangles) and the 
rest of the United States (circles).  Premiums and benefits represent total premium revenue and 
benefit payments and are in 1980 dollars and expressed in thousands of dollars.  The data come 
from Health Insurance Association of America surveys and Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Association surveys.  The vertical line marks 1976, the first year in which health insurance plans 
would have been affected by insurers’ response to the policy.     
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Figure 3.6 State difference-in-difference effects: commercial and Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield premiums and benefits 
The figure plots the distribution of difference-in-difference estimates (eq(2)) using each state in 
the estimation sample (N=47) as the control group.  The left panel shows the state effects for 
premiums and the right panel shows the results for benefits.  All estimates are obtained using 
ordinary least squares and include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state 
population, the age and sex distribution of the population, and the size of the health insurance 
market. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  The dashed vertical lines mark the 5th and 
95th percentiles.  The black vertical line marks the effect for Michigan.   
  
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−20 0 20 40
State Effect
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−20 0 20 40
State Effect
 83 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive trends in the medical loss ratio and its components 
MLR Premiums Benefits 
Commercia
l BCBS   
Commercia
l BCBS   
Commercia
l BCBS 
Michigan 
1969-1975 0.80 0.93 129 180 103 168 
1976-1980 0.80 0.94 149 255 120 240 
Difference 0.00 0.01 21 75 17 72 
Rest of US 
1969-1975 0.71 0.93 54 38 40 36 
1976-1980 0.78 0.93 63 58 50 53 
Difference 0.06 0.00 9 20 11 17 
Difference in 
Differences -0.06 0.01   11 55   6 55 
The table displays the average state-level MLR, premium revenue, and aggregate benefit 
payments for commercial and Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurers in Michigan, and the rest of 
the United States, in the period before the law took effect (1969-1975) and the years after the law 
took effect (1976-1980). 
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Table 3.2 The effect of Michigan’s minimum medical loss ratio rule on commercial loss 
ratios 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Michigan 0.119** 0.095 0.124** 0.092 
[0.036] [0.062] [0.026] [0.048] 
Post-1975 0.073** 0.113** 0.062** 0.106** 
[0.018] [0.016] [0.013] [0.010] 
Michigan Post-1975 -0.068** -0.079** -0.061** -0.074** 
[0.008] [0.009] [0.022] [0.026] 
Working Aged Population 
(20-64) 0.00003 0.00012 -0.00004 -0.00014 
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Elderly Population (65+) -0.00001 -0.00006 0.00011 0.00024 
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0003] 
Total Population -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 
[0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0004] [0.0005] 
Fraction Female 2.1 3.991 1.42 3.3* 
[2.7] [3.64] [1.25] [1.7] 
Per Capita Income -0.0011 -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0031 
[0.0023] [0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0022] 
Size of Hospital Insurance 
Market -0.0001 -0.0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] 
Size of Surgical Insurance 
Market 0.00001 0.00001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] 
Constant -0.3 -1.351 0.021 -1.01 
[1.4] [1.88] [0.64] [0.85] 
Observations 564 423 564 423 
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.78 
The table displays results from regressions as specified in equation (2).  The dependent variable 
is the average state-level MLR among commercial insurers.  Columns 1 and 2 are estimated by 
ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  
Columns 3 and 4 are estimated by robust regression.  All models include state and year fixed 
effects.  * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, and * indicates significance at the 5% 
level.
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Table 3.3 The effect of Michigan’s minimum MLR rule on BCBS MLRs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Michigan -0.0412 -0.084 -0.018 -0.049 
[0.046] [0.058] [0.021] [0.039] 
Post-1975 0.046* -0.068** 0.056** 
-
0.0470** 
[0.022] [0.017] [0.011] [0.0083] 
Michigan × 1975 0.0103 0.001 0.027 0.011 
[0.024] [0.017] [0.018] [0.021] 
Working Age Population (20-64) 0.00001 -0.00015 -0.00005 -0.00011 
[0.00026] [0.00045] [0.00013] [0.00019] 
Elderly Population (65+) -0.00053 -0.00018 -0.00011 0.00000 
[0.00055] [0.00065] [0.00015] [0.00023] 
Total Population 0.00008 0.00010 0.00004 0.00003 
[0.00006] [0.00009] [0.00003] [0.00004] 
Fraction Female 6.4 6.5 -0.8 1.2 
[7.4] [7.6] [1.0] [1.3] 
Per Capita Income 0.0040 0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0029 
[0.0041] [0.0055] [0.0014] [0.0018] 
Hospital Insurance Market -0.00002 -0.00000 
[0.00003] [0.00001] 
Surgical Insurance Market 0.00003 0.00001 
[0.00002] [0.00001] 
Constant -2.3 -2. 4 1.37** 0.36 
[3.8] [3.9] [0.51] [0.69] 
Observations 564 423 564 423 
R-squared 0.18 0.23 0.58 0.61 
The table displays results from regressions as specified in equation (2).  The dependent variable 
is the average state-level MLR among Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurers.  Columns 1 and 2 are 
estimated by ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the 
state level.  Columns 3 and 4 are estimated by robust regression.  All models include state and 
year fixed effects.  * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, and * indicates significance 
at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.4 The effect of Michigan’s minimum medical loss ratio rule on commercial medical 
loss ratios, triple-difference estimator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Michigan -0.007 -0.0354 -0.003 -0.032 
[0.031] [0.044] [0.025] [0.045] 
Commercial -0.219** -0.222** 
-
0.2102** 
-
0.2095** 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.0034] [0.0039] 
Post-1975 0.001 -0.0016 0.0098 0.0032 
[0.011] [0.0077] [0.0080] [0.0075] 
Michigan X Commercial 0.092** 0.082** 0.094** 0.079** 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.024] [0.027] 
Michigan X Post-1975 0.0113 0.002 0.023 0.004 
[0.018] [0.014] [0.026] [0.033] 
Post-1974 X Commercial 0.069** 0.077** 0.0630** 0.0663** 
[0.013] [0.011] [0.0053] [0.0068] 
Michigan X Post-1975 X 
Commercial -0.079** -0.082** -0.084* -0.080 
[0.013] [0.011] [0.037] [0.046] 
Working Age Population (20-64) 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00014 
[0.00019] [0.00032] [0.00013] [0.00021] 
Elderly Population (65+) -0.00027 -0.00012 0.00004 0.00020 
[0.00033] [0.00042] [0.00016] [0.00025] 
Total Population 0.00002 0.00004 0.00001 0.00002 
[0.00004] [0.00006] [0.00003] [0.00005] 
Fraction Female 4.2 5.3 0.1 1.4 
[4.2] [4.7] [1.0] [1.5] 
Per Capita Income 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0032 
[0.0022] [0.0030] [0.0014] [0.0020] 
Hospital Insurance Market -0.00002 -0.00000 
[0.00001] [0.00001] 
Surgical Insurance Market 0.00002 0.00001 
[0.00001] [0.00001] 
Constant -1.21 -1.8 0.88 0.20 
[2.17] [2.4] [0.54] [0.76] 
Observations 1,128 846 1,128 846 
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.85 0.84 
The table displays results from regressions as specified in equation (3). The dependent variable is 
the average state-level commercial MLR. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated by ordinary least 
squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  Columns 3 and 
4 are estimated by robust regression.  All models include state and year fixed effects. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level, and * indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table 3.5 The effect of Michigan’s minimum medical loss ratio rule on premium revenue 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Michigan 49* 83* 71.9** 73.9** 
[18] [31] [2.4] [3.9] 
Post-1975 8.2 -2.9 4.2** -1.48 
[6.3] [2.8] [1.3] [0.82] 
Michigan × 1975 13.8** 9.9** 16.6** 15.9** 
[1.8] [2.0] [2.1] [2.1] 
Working Age Population (20-
64) 0.12 0.17 0.032* 0.023 
[0.19] [0.20] [0.015] [0.019] 
Elderly Population (65+) 0.09 0.08 0.052** 0.079** 
[0.17] [0.17] [0.018] [0.022] 
Total Population -0.018 -0.022 -0.0016 0.0011 
[0.039] [0.041] [0.0034] [0.0042] 
Fraction Female -574 -493 -197 -133 
[660] [510] [120] [130] 
Per-capita Income -0.09 -0.25 -0.15 -0.19 
[0.20] [0.35] [0.16] [0.18] 
Hospital Insurance Market -0.0156 -0.0055** 
[0.0093] [0.0012] 
Surgical Insurance Market 0.0076 0.0047** 
[0.0087] [0.0010] 
Constant 301 286 127* 102 
[330] [260] [60] [68] 
Observations 564 423 564 423 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
The table displays results from regressions as specified in equation (2) and equation (3). The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is state-level premium revenue for commercial insurers.  
Columns 3 and 4 are state-level premium revenue for Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurers.  
Columns 1 and 3 are estimated by ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors clustered at the state level.  Columns 2 and 4 are estimated by robust regression.  All 
models include state and year fixed effects.  * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, 
and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.6 The effect of Michigan’s minimum medical loss ratio rule on benefit payments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Michigan 40* 58* 60.1** 60.1** 
[19] [23] [1.8] [2.9] 
Post-1975 8.5 3.2 5.00** 2.42** 
[6.3] [2.2] [0.93] [0.61] 
Michigan × 1975 8.3** 2.8 15.1** 1.4 
[2.0] [1.7] [1.5] [1.6] 
Working Age Population (20-
64) 0.14 0.15 0.040** 0.028* 
[0.18] [0.18] [0.011] [0.014] 
Elderly Population (65+) 0.05 0.09 0.041** 0.063** 
[0.18] [0.16] [0.013] [0.017] 
Total Population -0.026 -0.021 -0.0061* -0.0027 
[0.038] [0.036] [0.0025] [0.0031] 
Fraction Female -471 -429 -143 -146 
[630] [440] [87] [99] 
Per-capita Income -0.00 -0.29 -0.18 -0.35** 
[0.22] [0.31] [0.12] [0.13] 
Hospital Insurance Market -0.0176* -0.0045** 
[0.0072] [0.00087] 
Surgical Insurance Market 0.0124 0.00422** 
[0.0067] [0.00078] 
Constant 243 233 92* 97 
[320] [220] [45] [51] 
Observations 564 423 564 423 
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
The table displays results from regressions as specified in equation (2) and equation (3). The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is state-level aggregate benefit payments for commercial 
insurers.  Columns 3 and 4 are state-level aggregate benefit payments for Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield insurers.  Columns 1 and 3 are estimated by ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  Columns 2 and 4 are estimated by robust 
regression.  All models include state and year fixed effects. * indicates statistical significance at 
the 1% level, and * indicates significance at the 5% level.   
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Appendix 
Table 3.7 Estimation sample descriptive statistics 
Mean SD N 
MLR 0.84 0.13 1128 
Premiums 55 72 1128 
Benefits 46 62 1128 
Working Age Population (20-64) 
(1,000's) 536 584 1128 
Elderly Population (65+) (1,000's) 250 248 1128 
Total Population (1,000's) 1503 1552 1128 
Fraction Female 0.51 0.0064 1128 
Per capita Income ($1,000's) 4.4 1.9 1128 
Hospital Insurance Market 3235 3605 846 
Surgical Insurance Market (Covered 
Lives) 3054 3465 846 
The table displays the means, standard deviations and observations for MLRs, premium revenue 
($1,000), aggregate benefit payments ($1,000) from Health Insurance Association of America 
member surveys.  It also displays counts of working age, elderly and total population in 1,000’s 
as well as the fraction of the state population that is female from the Surveillance, Epidemiology 
and End Results program, and state –per capita income in $1,000 from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Hospital and surgical insurance market size, in terms of 1,000’s of covered lives, 
come from Health Insurance Association of America member surveys, but are not available in all 
years.   
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Chapter 4 Do Pap smears reduce cervical cancer mortality?  
Evidence from federal family planning funding 
 
No form of clinical cancer better documents the remarkable effects of early diagnosis and 
curative therapy on the mortality rate than cancer of the cervix…the lowered mortality 
rate reflects the earlier discovery of curable lesions…Thanks for these impressive 
improvements are largely owed to the Papanicolaou cytologic test for the detection of 
cancer 
-- Robbin, Cotran, and Kumar (1974) 
 
The most widely cited evidence of the contribution of cytologic screening to the reduction 
in cervical cancer mortality is the long-term decline in deaths from cervical cancer in the 
United States coincident with the introduction of the Pap smear. In actuality, death rates 
had begun to decline prior to widespread use of Pap smears, perhaps due to […] other 
factors. 
--Shingleton et al. (1995) 
 
Introduction 
Hailed as a cancer screening success story, the Papanicolaou (“Pap”) smear is widely 
credited for dramatic reductions in cervical cancer over the 20th century (Casper and Clarke 
1998; DeMay 2000; National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Panel 1996; Waxman 
2005).  Shortly after Dr. Papanicolaou presented his work on the cervical cancer screening test in 
1928 (Papanicolaou 1928), deaths from cancers of the female reproductive organs began to 
precipitously fall.  Cancers of the uterus, including both the uterine body, and the cervix, 
declined over 80 percent from 36 deaths per 100,000 women in 1930—the first year it was 
measured—to six deaths per 100,000 women in 2009 (Siegel et al. 2011).  Since the 1950s, the 
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American Cancer Society has heavily promoted the Pap smear, and guidelines have recommend 
regular Pap smears for women of reproductive age since 2001 (Waxman 2005).     
Although many studies (National Cancer Institute 2014) show that screening is correlated 
with reductions in cervical cancer mortality, whether the Pap smear has a causal effect on 
cervical cancer mortality remains an open question. In some countries, reductions in cervical 
cancer mortality actually preceded the introduction of mass screening campaigns (Raffle 1997; 
Gardner and Lyon 1977).  In the United States, for example, uterine cancer mortality had already 
declined for nearly three decades before the first mass screening campaign began in 1957.  This 
included over a decade of decline before the Pap smear became an accepted medical practice in 
the mid-1940s (Gardner and Lyon 1977; Löwy 2011).  Furthermore, the test has never been 
evaluated in a randomized controlled trial because of the ethical challenges of withholding a 
cancer screening with presumed benefits.  Experimental evidence is particularly important 
because the endogeneity of screening and cervical cancer mortality risk may confound estimates 
of the effect of Pap smears on cervical cancer mortality in observational studies.   
This paper takes a new approach to estimating the causal effect of the Pap smear on 
cervical cancer mortality in the United States.  I exploit a natural experiment in the availability of 
subsidized Pap smears provided through federal grants for family planning.  Starting in 1965, 
these grants provided funding to family planning clinics to provide subsidized reproductive care, 
including Pap smears, to low-income women.  As documented by Bailey (2012), the chaotic 
nature of the grant-making process for the earliest grants between 1965 and 1973 offers a natural 
experiment in the availability of subsidized reproductive health care.  I find that women who 
lived in communities that received grant funding were 8-13 percent more likely to have had a 
Pap smear in the last year. I also find that increased screening did not result in statistically 
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significant changes in cervical cancer mortality up to 15 years later.  However, due to 
imprecision of the estimates, I cannot rule out existing estimates of the Pap smear’s 
effectiveness.  
Although the results of this paper are inconclusive, the Pap smear’s role in the prevention 
of cervical cancer mortality should be re-evaluated.  First, public resources are frequently 
directed toward increasing Pap smear utilization among women who receive screenings less 
frequently than guidelines recommend. Public efforts to increase Pap smear screenings include 
national screening campaigns (Henson, Wyatt, and Lee 1996; Gardner 2006), mandates that 
require insurers to cover Pap smears in 20 states (Bitler and Carpenter 2012), Medicaid family 
planning program expansions (Wherry 2013), and the recent Affordable Care Act requirement 
that nearly all insurers not only cover, but also waive cost sharing for Pap smears (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2013b).  This most recent effort is expected to extend subsidized screening, 
including Pap smears, to an estimated 20 million women (Sommers and Wilson 2012).    
Second, alternative screening methods have been introduced in recent years.  The first 
genetic test for the virus that causes nearly all cases of cervical cancer, Human Papilloma Virus 
(HPV), was developed in 2000 (National Cancer Institute 2014).  Genetic HPV tests are nearly 
twice as likely as Pap smears to detect pre-cancerous cells among women who are actually at-
risk for cervical cancer (95% vs. 55%), but are only slightly more likely to produce a false-
positive result (6% vs. 3%) (National Cancer Institute 2014).  While HPV tests have been used 
alongside Pap smears over the last decade, the FDA approved another version this April, which 
may be used as an alternative to the Pap smear (Food and Drug Administration 2014).  Still, 
despite evidence that it may be superior, the approval of this new test has been controversial due 
to the perceived superiority of the Pap smear (Coaltion Letter 2014).    
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Cervical cancer etiology, screening, and treatment 
Cancer of the uterus has been one of the most recognizable diseases affecting women 
throughout history (Löwy 2011).  In the beginning of the 20th century, it was the leading cause of 
cancer death among women of reproductive age (15-44), and the eighth leading cause of death 
among women of all ages (United States Census Bureau 1910).  It is generally accepted that 
cervical cancer is caused almost exclusively by HPV, which can be transmitted through sexual 
activity (National Cancer Institute 2014).  HPV infections may take 10-20 years to turn into 
cervical cancer, but only a fraction of the many women who are infected will develop invasive 
cervical cancer (National Cancer Institute 2014; Saslow et al. 2002). 
Invasive cervical cancer is preceded by pre-cancerous lesions on the cervix.  Depending 
on the severity, most pre-cancerous lesions that will progress to cervical cancer do so within 2-5 
years (Holowaty et al. 1999).  As a result of its long natural history, the risk of cervical cancer 
mortality increases with age, with the highest risk of mortality between ages 45 and 70 (Saslow 
et al. 2002).    
The idea behind the Pap smear is that cervical cancer can be anticipated by routinely 
checking the cervix for pre-cancerous lesions.  During a Pap smear, the doctor uses a device 
called a speculum to visualize the cervix and exfoliates cervical cells with a small brush.  The 
cells are then examined under a microscope for the presence of pre-cancerous lesions.  
Depending on their size and shape, these lesions can be mild, moderate, or severe, and may 
include cancerous cells that have not yet spread to surrounding tissue.  Mild lesions often 
disappear over time—70 percent disappear within six years, and only six percent become severe.  
It is estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of severe lesions turn into invasive cervical cancer 
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(National Cancer Institute 2014).  Of the estimated 50 million Pap smears performed each year, 
2-3 million detect mild lesions and about 600,000 detect moderate or severe lesions (Jones 
1995).     
Current guidelines by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (2008) 
recommend that women with mild lesions undergo further testing such as an HPV DNA test or a 
repeat Pap smear within the year.  In some cases, the presence of mild lesions is followed by a 
cervical tissue biopsy, called a colposcopy.  For most women with moderate or severe lesions, 
guidelines recommend colposcopy or excision of the abnormal tissue.  Depending on the severity 
of the lesions, the method for tissue removal ranges from a minimally invasive procedure that 
can be done with local anesthetic in a doctor’s office, to hysterectomy, a serious operation that 
requires general anesthesia (Löwy 2011).   
Although the Pap smear has changed very little since its introduction, both the 
classification of lesions and guidelines for follow-up have evolved over the last century.  In the 
past, confusion over classification sometimes led to ambiguous test results and a propensity to 
treat even mild lesions (Löwy 2011).  Through the 1950s, women with cervical lesions—and 
sometimes even very minor abnormalities—were treated with radiation therapy, hysterectomy, or 
both.  Both treatments could result in sterility (Löwy 2011).  After it was discovered in the 1960s 
that many mild lesions spontaneously regress after biopsy, immediate hysterectomy and radiation 
therapy were gradually replaced with more conservative measures that removed only the 
minimum necessary amount of suspect tissue.  These measures include burning or freezing 
lesions, zapping lesions with lasers, or using specialized equipment to cut out abnormal cells 
(Löwy 2011).   
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What do we know about the effect of pap smears on cervical cancer mortality? 
Although it has been extensively studied—a MEDLINE search of the word “Pap smear” 
yields over 3,000 publications—and its effectiveness is taken as given (National Cancer Institute 
2014; National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Panel 1996), there are several 
reasons to re-evaluate the causal role of the Pap smear in preventing cervical cancer.  First, the 
time-series evidence from the United States and several other countries suggests that cervical 
cancer mortality was declining decades before the Pap smear was widely used.  Second, the 
observational study designs to which researchers are limited often cannot rule out alternative 
hypotheses.  
The observational evidence in support of the Pap smear’s role in decreasing cervical 
cancer mortality can be categorized into several groups.  The first group consists of cohort 
studies.  This type of evidence compares cohorts of women who were screened to those who 
were not (e.g. Andrae et al. (2012)).  But because women who seek screening are also likely to 
make better health investments than those who do not, advantageous selection into screening is 
likely.  Assuming advantageous selection, comparing the mortality of women who are diagnosed 
with cervical cancer as a result of screening to those who are diagnosed subsequent to the 
emergence of symptoms—even controlling for the stage of the disease—overestimates the 
benefits of the Pap smear on mortality. 
The second group consists of cross-country comparisons.  These studies compare 
screening and mortality rates across countries and find a negative association between screening 
rates and cervical cancer mortality (e.g. Arbyn et al. (2009) or Lăără, Day, and Hakama (1987) ).  
The chief problem with this approach is that the screening rates could be endogenous: countries 
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with higher screening rates have better medical resources, which could also directly affect 
cervical cancer mortality.  In this example, both the screening rates and mortality are artifacts of 
a third, confounding factor.   
The third group is within-country comparisons over time, which compare changes in 
screening to changes in cervical cancer mortality within a country (e.g.,Quinn et al. (1999); 
Mählck, Jonsson, and Lenner (1994); Miller, Lindsay, and Hill (1976); or Pettersson, Bjorkholm, 
and Naslund (1985)).  One problem with studies of this type is that they often do not have 
control groups because screening is conducted as part of a national campaign in which all 
women are targets.  Without a control, group, a reduction in cervical cancer mortality due to 
cervical cancer screening cannot be separated from cervical cancer mortality reductions resulting 
from other factors.  For example, changes in treatment options for cervical cancer that occur at 
the same time as a screening campaign may also reduce cervical cancer mortality.   
Furthermore, two features of the time series literature actually cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of the Pap smear: most plots of age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality rates show 
no trend break in mortality after the establishment of cervical cancer screening programs (Arbyn 
et al. 2009), and in some countries, the decline in cervical cancer mortality pre-dates the 
introduction of the screening program altogether (Raffle 1997).  A notable exception is a study of 
screening and mortality in Iceland by Johannesson, Geirsson, and Day (1978).  They show that 
the cervical cancer mortality rate was increasing before Iceland’s national campaign and then fell 
after several years of screening. 
Figure 4.1 presents time series evidence from the United States.  Cancers of the female 
genitalia, including the uterine body and uterine cervix, rise beginning in 1910, the first year they 
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are measured, and peak in 1935 at 42 deaths per 100,000 women, falling thereafter.  The earliest 
recorded uterine (1930), and cervical (1946) cancers follow a similar downward trend.  Although 
the reduction in age-adjusted gynecological cancers appears to be precipitated by the 
introduction of the Pap smear in the late 1920s, the test would not become accepted medical 
practice for at least a decade.  The original presentation of Dr. Papanicolaou’s work (line A) was 
at a little-attended eugenics conference in Battle Creek, Michigan (Papanicolaou 1928).  The 
work was met with skepticism because it was based on only a few cases, including 
Papanicolaou’s wife (Löwy 2011).  It was not until 1941 (line B), that the first-peer reviewed 
paper on the subject was published (Papanicolaou and Traunt 1941). By this point, uterine cancer 
mortality had already declined by 11 percent. 
By the mid-1940s, Americans had begun to hear about the test through the popular press, 
and demand began to grow despite severe supply constraints.  At that time, there were few 
pathologists with the training necessary to read the tests (Gardner 2006).  These constraints led 
the American Cancer Society to convene the first Cytological Diagnostic Conference in 1948 
(line C).  At the conference, it was decided that neither physicians nor cancer control advocates 
would publicize the test until supply constraints had been alleviated (Gardner 2006).  As a result 
of these constraints, relatively few Pap smears were administered in the 1950s; national surveys 
of cytologic facilities estimated that only one million tests were read in 1955 (Horn and Siegel 
1961).  Once capacity to read Pap smears caught up, the American Cancer Society launched the 
first nationwide Pap smear campaign in 1957 (line D).  The number of Pap smears performed 
climbed to about 15 million in 1968 (Manos and Robins 1972)—still only a fifth of the 70 
million yearly Pap smears that are performed today (Sirovich and Welch 2004). 
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Uncertainty over inconsistent time series evidence and the use of observational studies to 
estimate causal effects have previously incited debates over the Pap smear’s role in cervical 
cancer mortality declines (Raffle 1997; Gardner and Lyon 1977).  Yet these concerns remain 
unaddressed, in part because of the inability to conduct a randomized controlled trial.  In the 
absence of true experimental evidence, a natural experiment—where Pap smear screening occurs 
in an essentially random way—may help to add evidence to this debate. 
 
Federal family planning grant-making as a natural experiment 
In the absence of a randomized controlled trial, generating causal evidence on the effect 
of Pap smears on cervical cancer mortality requires some type of exogenous variation in the 
treatment, such as an instrument.  I use a natural experiment in Pap smear access provided by 
initial federal grants for family planning.  Starting in 1965, the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity government began awarding grants to community organizations to fund family 
planning clinics (for a detailed description of the program and funding scheme, see Bailey 
(2012)).  The grants established clinics with the primary purpose of dispensing free or low-cost 
contraceptives to low-income women, but they were also encouraged to provide subsidized 
preventive health services (Gold 2001; Dryfoos 1976), such as Pap smears.  The chaotic grant-
making process between 1965 and 1973 resulted in nearly random variation in access to 
subsidized reproductive care (Bailey 2012). 
A valid instrument for cervical cancer screening must be both relevant (it predicts Pap 
smear use) and excludable (it has no effect on cervical cancer mortality except through increased 
use of Pap smears).  Free or heavily subsidized screenings through funded clinics should have 
increased the fraction of women who were screened because lowering the cost of the test 
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increases its net expected benefit (Picone, Sloan, and Taylor 2004).  I can use microdata on Pap 
smear utilization to test whether this is true.   
The second criterion, excludability, is more difficult to demonstrate because it cannot be 
tested directly.  The family planning clinics affected more than just screening.  In fact, the chief 
goal of the federal family planning grants was to fund clinics that would assist women in 
achieving their desired number of children by providing free or low-cost birth control (Bailey 
2012).  Evaluations of the program using expansions in the 1990s found that family planning 
clinics increased respondents’ likelihood of having used birth control in the past month (Kearney 
and Levine 2009).  The concern for excludability is that greater availability of some kinds of 
contraception could have an independent effect on cervical cancer incidence and mortality 
through HPV transmission rates.  HPV is spread through sexual contact and can be prevented 
with barrier contraceptive methods such as condoms, but is not affected by non-barrier methods 
such as birth control pills or the intra-uterine device.  If the introduction of funded family 
planning clinics resulted in increased use of condoms, transmission rates may have fallen, 
resulting in fewer cases of cervical cancer.  Alternatively, if condom use decreased because 
women used other forms of birth control instead, then transmission rates may have risen.  
Increased use of contraceptives may have also had an effect on the frequency of sexual 
intercourse.  As the price of pregnancy prevention falls, couples can have more sexual 
intercourse and still achieve desired fertility.  All things being equal, more unprotected sexual 
activity should increase HPV transmission.  I can use microdata on condom use and frequency of 
sexual intercourse to test whether the instrument is valid.   
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Estimation strategy and data 
To estimate the effect of the Pap smear on cervical cancer mortality, I use variation in 
access to free or low-cost Pap smears through the effectively random grant-making process for 
family planning clinics between 1965 and 1973.  I link data on the timing of Office of Economic 
Opportunity grants compiled by (Bailey 2012) with microdata on Pap smear use and county-
level mortality statistics.  The first goal of my analysis is to test whether federal family planning 
funding increased cervical cancer screening in the community in which the clinic was funded.  
The second goal is to test whether family planning funding reduced deaths from cervical cancer 
among women in the community in which the clinic was funded.  
To test whether introduction of a family planning clinic increases the likelihood of Pap 
smear utilization, I use the only source of microdata on Pap smear use during this time period: 
the 1970 National Fertility Survey (Westoff and Ryder 1977).  The National Fertility Survey is a 
nationally representative survey of ever-married women aged 14-45, designed to provide 
information on marital fertility and family planning.  This sample is likely to be more 
representative of older than younger women.  According the 1970 census, only 33 percent of 
women under age 25 were ever-married, but this fraction is over 90 percent for women aged 25 
or older (Ruggles et al. 2010).  The survey contains information on the primary sampling unit 
(PSU) in which each woman lived, which is about the size of a county.  This information allows 
me to observe whether, in 1970, the woman lived in a PSU with a federally funded family 
planning clinic and the date the clinic was initially funded.  I estimate the effect of receiving a 
grant on Pap smear utilization using equation (1): 
(1) Ij(IkI)	! = >? + >1(l<meU<70)	! + DC	! + g + 	!  
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The variable IkI	! indicates having received a Pap smear in the 12 months prior to the 
survey, and l<meU<70	! indicates that woman i lived in a population sampling unit, p, that 
received family planning center funding before 1970.  C	! is a vector of individual controls 
including 10-year age categories, a dummy for whether the population sampling unit is urban, as 
well as dummies for white race and Catholic religion, and dummies for completed years of 
education.  I also include state fixed-effects, g to remove time-invariant state characteristics.  
This regression is run on a sample of 6,676 women from both ever- and never-funded counties 
and the standard errors are both robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered at the PSU level.  I 
also use a specification identical to equation (1) to test the effect of family planning funding on 
the channels of HPV transmission: frequency of sexual intercourse and use of condoms.    
To estimate the effect of Pap smears on cervical cancer mortality, I use linked data on 
grant timing and county-level, age-adjusted mortality statistics from 1959 through 1988 
constructed from Vital Statistics Multiple Cause of Death records (National Center for Health 
2008).  Following Bailey’s (2012) study of the effect of family planning funding on birth rates, I 
use a flexible difference-in-differences approach, called an event study.  This specification 
compares mortality in each period in event time to the year before the clinic was funded, and to 
average mortality across unfunded counties.  Equation (2) illustrates the approach: 
(2)co= = G? + ∑ Gqbo1(r − mo = s)Bqth + ∑ G
bo1(r − mo = )O
t? + QCo= + go + &= + g ∗ &=    
The dependent variable is co=, the age-adjusted, county-level cervical cancer mortality 
rate per 100,000 women.  Age adjustment re-weights the cancer statistics to control for 
differences in the age distribution across counties.  I age-adjust using five-year age categories 
from the 1960 census.  bo
 is a dummy variable for each treated county c, interacted with 
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indicators for each of the k periods before, and j periods after the community organization in the 
county received funding (mo).  The set of coefficients Gq	gives the difference in the outcome 
between k periods before the clinic was funded, and the year before the clinic received the grant, 
mo (the omitted category), and the average outcome in unfunded counties over the sample period.  
For example, if co= represents cervical cancer mortality, Gh gives the difference in age-adjusted 
cervical cancer mortality in the county between six periods before the clinic was funded, and the 
year before it was actually funded, compared to average cervical cancer mortality in the rest of 
the unfunded counties.  The set of coefficients G
 are conceptually similar; they give the 
difference in age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality between periods, after the clinic was funded 
and the year before it received the grant, relative to unfunded counties.  If family planning 
funding increases the use of Pap smears, and Pap smears reduce cervical cancer mortality, I 
expect the estimated G
 coefficients to be negative.  
Co=	is a vector of county-level controls following (Bailey 2012).  These include 
interactions of characteristics measured in the 1960 census with a linear time trend, such as the 
fraction of the county that is urban, the fraction that is non-white, and measures of age and 
income distributions in each county.  I also include county-level fixed-effects to control for 
differences between counties, go, year fixed-effects to remove national trends in cervical cancer 
mortality, &=, and state-by-year fixed-effects to control for non-linear time trends across states, 
g × &=.  All regression are weighted by county-level population in the 1960 census. 
Because changes, or a lack of changes, in mortality could reflect either the effectiveness 
of the Pap smear, or the effectiveness of treatments for invasive cervical cancer, I also 
investigate the effect of family planning clinics on the incidence of invasive cervical cancer.  I 
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use historical data from the Connecticut Tumor Registry, the oldest statewide registry in the U.S. 
and the only source of such information before 1973 (Haenszel and Curnen 1986). I estimate the 
following event study:  
 
(3) co= = ? + ∑ qbo1(r − mo = s)Bqth + ∑ 
bo1(r − mo = )O
t? + QCo= + go + &= 
Now co= represents the age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence rate, equal to the 1960 
census-weighted rate of invasive cervical cancer per 100,000 women. The set of coefficients q 
gives the effect of federal family planning funding on cervical cancer incidence k years before 
the clinic was funded, and 
  gives the effect j years after funding. 
 
Results 
Descriptive trends 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics from the 1970 National Fertility Survey.  The 
fraction of women in unfunded counties who had received a pap smear within the previous year 
is similar to that of women who lived in counties that would eventually be funded but were not at 
the time of the survey (1970).  Screening in the last year was six percentage points higher among 
women who lived in population sampling units that had already received funding by 1970.  In 
terms of modes of HPV transmission, the three types of women in the sample do not differ 
substantially.  Frequency of sexual intercourse was approximately eight times per week for all 
women.  Condom use in never-funded PSUs was also similar to that in PSUs funded before 
1970.  Interestingly, condom use was three to five percentage points lower among women in 
eventually-funded PSUs. Age and educational distributions were similar across women in never-
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funded, eventually-funded, and funded PSUs.  The only important difference is that eventually-
funded PSUs were about 10 percentage points more likely to be urban than funded or never-
funded PSUs.    
Figure 4.2 gives trends in age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence and mortality over the 
sample period.  Between 1959 and 1988, the cervical cancer mortality rate declines smoothly 
from about nine deaths per 100,000 women, to three – a 66 percent reduction.  The average age-
adjusted cervical cancer mortality rate among unfunded counties is six.  Age-adjusted cervical 
cancer incidence also falls over the period, although the raw data are more variable, most likely 
because they come from only one state (Connecticut).  Incidence falls from 18 cases per 100,000 
to eight per 100,000—a 55 percent reduction.  The figure also gives the cumulative number of 
grants awarded over the sample period.  Grants are awarded yearly beginning in 1965, rising to 
654 by 1973.  Three of Connecticut’s eight counties were awarded grants over this period. 
 
Family planning and use of the Pap smear  
Table 4.2 presents results from a test of whether family planning clinics increased use of 
Pap smears in the year prior to the survey.  These regressions are specified according to equation 
(1).  The result from column one indicates that women who lived in a community with a family 
planning clinic were approximately five percentage points more likely to have received a Pap 
smear in the previous 12 months.  This result is both statistically and clinically significant.  In 
terms of the average level of screening, this effect represents an eight percent increase.  Adding 
state fixed-effects to control for level differences in screening across states that may be 
correlated with whether or not the PSU had a clinic, the effect increases in magnitude.  Women 
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who lived in a PSU that had a funded family planning clinic by 1970 were eight percentage 
points or 13 percent more likely to have received a recent Pap smear.   
Cervical cancer risk increases with age (Saslow et al. 2002), and false positives are very 
common among women under 20 (National Cancer Institute 2014).  If increases in screening 
were concentrated among the youngest women, then it may be difficult to detect a change in 
mortality because deaths to younger women are a relatively rare event.  However, if screening 
changes were driven by older women, then small changes in mortality will be easier to detect.  
Table 4.3 presents the results interacted with 10-year age categories.  Among women aged 20-29 
(the omitted group), living in a community with a funded family planning clinic increased the 
likelihood of having received a Pap smear in the previous year by almost six percentage points, 
or 8.5 percent in a model without state fixed-effects.  While the effect among women aged 30-39 
and 40-49 differed by only half a percentage point from the effect for women in their twenties, 
the youngest women (aged 14-19) were two percentage points less likely to have received a 
recent Pap smear than were women aged 20-29.  Although the interaction is not statistically 
significant, a Wald test of the joint significance of the main effect and the interaction cannot 
reject that the effect is different from zero (p=0.55).  The addition of state fixed-effects in 
column two increases the magnitude of the effect for women aged 20-29 to nine percentage 
points, or nearly 14 percent.  However, the effect among the youngest women is four percentage 
points smaller, and remains statistically insignificant.  The results suggest that the 8-13 percent 
screening increase was driven by women aged 20 and older.  
Table 4.4 provides evidence that funded family planning clinics had little effect on two 
behaviors that likely affect the transmission of HPV: sexual intercourse and condom use.  
Columns one and three present results from a regression specified as in equation (1), with 
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frequency of sexual intercourse in the previous month, and recent condom use as dependent 
variables.  Neither channel of HPV transmission is significantly affected.  Adding state fixed-
effects in columns two and four, women who had access to a funded family planning clinic 
increased sexual intercourse by less than one time per month, and the effect is not statistically 
different from zero.  In terms of condom use, women with access to a funded family planning 
clinic reduced condom use by a statistically insignificant 1.4 percentage points.  Although they 
are not statistically significant, the point estimates are both imprecise.  As a result, I cannot rule 
out a change of slightly less than one additional sexual encounter per month or a 20 percent 
change in condom use (0.03/0.16).  Therefore I cannot conclude that my instrument does not also 
affect HPV transmission rates.  If transmission rates fell, then the risk of cervical cancer should 
also fall, biasing my estimates in the direction of finding no effect.  
      
Family planning funding resulted in no change in age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality 
Figure 4.3 presents results from the mortality event study specified in equation (2).  Each 
point on a black line represents the coefficient on an event-time dummy.  These coefficients give 
the difference in the effect of funding in each period relative to the year before funding, and 
among unfunded counties, on age-adjusted cervical cancer deaths per 100,000 women.  The grey 
lines give the 95 percent confidence interval for each point estimate.  The figure shows that there 
are no pre-treatment effects, even controlling for state specific, non-linear time trends and linear 
trends in the 1960 county-level census characteristics.  
In the first six periods after a grant is received, there appears to be no effect across all 
specifications.  Although individual point estimates at periods one and four are almost 
statistically different than zero in some models, the variability of the effects over the six periods 
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suggests that these point estimates would not be different than zero if averaged together.  The 
magnitude of the standard errors suggests that the point estimates are imprecisely estimated.  The 
lower 95 percent confidence interval suggests that I cannot reject that a nearly 0.7 deaths per 
100,000 women decrease in cervical cancer is different from zero.  Relative to the average age-
adjusted cervical cancer mortality in ever-funded counties in the year before they were funded 
(6.3 deaths per 100,000 women), this is about a 10 percent decrease in cervical cancer mortality.  
The longer-term effects of family planning funding are less variable over time.  The point 
estimates are both constant and statistically insignificant after six periods in a regression with 
only county and year fixed-effects.  Adding state-specific non-linear time trends and controls 
does not change the results.  In order to increase the precision of the estimates, I pool the data 
into five-year periods.  The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 4.2, and the standard 
errors are similar: I cannot rule out an approximate 10 percent decrease in cervical cancer 
mortality.   
(Bailey 2012) shows that counties that received funding were more likely to be urban.  I 
include interactions of a linear time trend with the fraction of a county that is urban in my main 
results. As an additional robustness check, I also re-estimate equation (2) using only funded 
counties.  Figure 4.4 displays the results, which are similar.  There appears to be no pre-trend.  
With county-level and year fixed-effects, cervical cancer mortality appears to fall after the 
introduction of a family planning clinic, although the reduction is not statistically significant.  
Adding controls for non-linear state-level trends eliminates the downward cervical cancer 
mortality trend.  The standard errors are large.  Although the pattern is similar to that in Figure 
4.3, I cannot reject that an approximately 20 percent reduction in cervical cancer mortality is not 
different than zero.   
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Family planning funding did not change age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the effect of federal family planning grants on age-adjusted cervical 
cancer incidence, as in equation (3).  The figure plots the coefficients on event study dummies 
and their 95 percent confidence intervals, for regressions with county and year fixed-effects, and 
also county-by-year fixed-effects.  Not only is there no pre-treatment trend in invasive cervical 
cancer mortality, there is no change in the diagnosis of invasive cervical cancer after a family 
planning clinic is established in the county.  Because the sample includes only Connecticut, the 
standard errors are large.  As a share of average cervical cancer incidence over the year before 
funded counties received funding, the lower confidence interval implies that I cannot distinguish 
between zero and a forty percent reduction in cervical cancer incidence over the study period 
(mean age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence is 12 cases per 100,000 women).  In order to 
increase the precision of the estimates, in Table 4.6 Pooled estimates of the effect of family 
planning center funding on age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence, I pool the data into five-year 
periods, similar to in Table 4.5 Pooled estimates of the effect of family planning funding on age-
adjusted cervical cancer mortality.  The standard errors are similar: column one of Table 4.6 
Pooled estimates of the effect of family planning center funding on age-adjusted cervical cancer 
incidence suggests that I cannot rule out an approximately 40 percent decrease in cervical cancer 
mortality.   
 
Discussion 
This paper generates inconclusive, quasi-experimental evidence on the effectiveness of 
the Pap smear.  Using exogenous variation in the timing and receipt of federal grants for family 
planning, I find that clinic funding led to at least an eight percent increase in Pap smear 
screenings in the 12 months prior to the survey, driven by older women.  This increase in 
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screenings did not result in statistically significant reductions in cervical cancer mortality up to 
15 years later, but the estimates are imprecise; I cannot rule out a 10 percent increase or decrease 
in cervical cancer mortality.  I find similar results for cervical cancer incidence – there is no 
statistically significant change, but the standard errors are too imprecise to rule out even very 
large effects.    
To put my estimates into perspective, I calculate a treatment-on-the-treated estimate 
using the lower 95 percent confidence interval of my pooled mortality estimates as a maximum 
bound for the change in cervical cancer mortality implied by my estimates.  I then compare it to 
a similarly calculated estimate using results from a frequently cited paper on the relationship 
between a national cervical cancer screening in Iceland and cervical cancer mortality 
(Johannesson, Geirsson, and Day 1978; National Cancer Institute 2014). The method used to 
calculate these estimates is described in more detail in the appendix.  The maximum treatment-
on-the-treated effect implied by my estimates is a 72 percent reduction in cervical cancer 
mortality after about 10 years.  The treatment-on-the-treated estimate I calculate for 
Johannesson, Geirsson, and Day (1978) is also 72 percent.  This suggests that, although my 
estimates are imprecisely estimated, the maximum bound on the mortality effect is not 
implausible.   
Even with better precision of the estimates, there are several reasons to interpret the 
results with caution.  First, cervical cancer mortality depends not only on early detection, but also 
on follow-up and treatment choices, conditional on receiving an abnormal Pap smear result.  The 
treatment of pre-cancerous lesions became more conservative in the 1960s (Löwy 2011), but 
access to newer, less invasive options may have been limited for the low-income population that 
used funded family planning clinics.  Although many low-income women had access to 
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Medicaid (Goodman-Bacon 2013), these treatments were not necessarily covered.  Even as late 
as 2009, only seven states’ Medicaid programs included colposcopy as a covered family 
planning benefit (Ranji 2009).  If women were not aware these newer treatments were available 
or were unable to pay for them, they may have been reluctant to act upon positive Pap smear 
results because they did not want to undergo hysterectomy.  The non-pecuniary costs of 
hysterectomy were substantial; not only did women face non-trivial mortality risk during this 
major surgery, they also lost the ability to have children (Löwy 2011).  Second, my first-stage 
sample is skewed towards older women, who may have also been more likely to seek Pap 
smears.  If this is true, my first-stage estimates of family planning funding effects on Pap smears 
may be biased, overstating the effect of funding on screening.  Third, my event study estimates 
describe changes in county-level cervical cancer mortality up to 15 years after grant funding is 
received, but migration across counties introduces measurement error, which attenuates the 
estimated coefficients.  This would bias my estimates toward finding no effect.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper uses a natural experiment to investigate the effect of Pap smears on cervical 
cancer mortality.  I find that federal family planning grants increased screening, but had no clear 
effect on cervical cancer mortality.  Although the point estimates suggest little relationship 
between cervical cancer mortality and Pap smear screening, the standard errors are large.  I 
cannot distinguish my estimated zero from similar estimates in the literature.  Despite 
inconclusive results using a natural experiment, the time-series evidence provided here and 
elsewhere (Raffle 1997; Gardner and Lyon 1977) suggests that the effect of Pap smears on 
cervical cancer mortality remains an open question.  Given public policy efforts to increase 
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screening, as well as recent controversy over the approval of an alternative—and possibly 
superior—test, researchers should continue to investigate this issue.   
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Figures and tables 
Figure 4.1 Age-adjusted gynecological cancer mortality, Pap smear capacity and adoption 
of the Pap smear 
The figure plots age-adjusted gynecological cancers and Pap smears performed between 1910 
and 2009.  All mortality series are adjusted using the 1960 population distribution from the 1960 
census.  Female genital cancers come from 1910-1956 annual mortality statistics reports.  
Uterine cancers from the American Cancer Society, and cervical cancers come from 1945-1968 
annual vital statistics reports and 1959-1988 multiple cause mortality files.  The number of Pap 
smears comes from results of national surveys of cytologic facilities reported in (Horn and Siegel 
1961; Horn and Watanabe 1965; Manos and Robins 1972), and estimates based on nationally 
representative population surveys (Jones 1995; Sirovich and Welch 2004).  Line A indicates the 
first presentation of work on the Pap smear, line B indicates the first peer-reviewed publication 
on the Pap smear, line C indicates the first conference of exfolliative cytology, and line D 
indicates the start of the first national screening campaign.   
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Figure 4.2 Age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality and incidence, and federal family 
planning grants 
The figure plots age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality and incidence, as well as the cumulative 
total of federal grants for family planning.  Age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality rates come 
from the 1959-1988 multiple cause mortality files and are adjusted to the 1960 age distribution 
using the 1960 census.  Age-adjusted cervical cancer incidence comes from the historical 
Connecticut Tumor Registry and Connecticut tumor registry data from the Surveillence 
Epidemiology and End Results program.  Data on federal family planning program grants were 
provided by Martha Bailey and are described in (Bailey 2012).    
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Figure 4.3 Event study estimates of the effect of family planning center funding on age-
adjusted cervical cancer mortality 
The figure plots event study point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
living in a community with a federally funded family planning center on age-adjusted cervical 
cancer mortality relative to the year before funding was granted.  Model one includes county and 
year fixed effects and model two adds state-by-year fixed effects and controls.  Both models are 
weighted by county population.  The sample includes 19,620 county-year observations from all 
counties.  Age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality rates come from the 1959-1988 multiple cause 
mortality files and are adjusted to the 1960 age distribution using the 1960 census.  All standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the county level 
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Figure 4.4 Event study estimates of effect of family planning center funding on age-
adjusted cervical cancer mortality, funded counties only 
The figure plots event study point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
living in a community with a federally funded family planning center on age-adjusted cervical 
cancer mortality relative to the year before funding was granted.  Model one includes county and 
year fixed effects and model two adds state-by-year fixed effects and controls.  Both models are 
weighted by county population.  The sample includes 19,620 county-year observations from all 
counties.  Age adjusted cervical cancer mortality rates come from the 1959-1988 multiple cause 
mortality files and are adjusted to the 1960 age distribution using the 1960 census.  All standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the county level.  
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Figure 4.5 Event study estimates of the effect of family planning center funding on age-
adjusted cervical cancer incidence 
The figure plots event study point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
living in a community with a federally funded family planning center on age-adjusted cervical 
cancer incidence relative to the year before funding was granted.  All models are estimated on 
data from the Connecticut Tumor Registry and include county and year fixed effects and use 
nationally representative probability weights.  Model two introduces controls.  The sample 
includes 248 county-year observations from all 8 counties in Connecticut.  Incidence is adjusted 
to the 1960 age distribution using the 1960 census.  All standard errors are heteroskedasticity 
robust and clustered at the county level 
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Table 4.1 Sample statistics, 1970 National Fertility Survey 
Never Funded 
(N=3203) 
Funded 
Eventually Funded 
(N=504) Funded 1970 (N=3018) 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Pap Smear Last Year 0.66 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 
Sexual Last 4 Weeks 8.3 7.1 7.9 6.0 8. 6 8.4 
Recent Condom Use 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 
Age Categories 
14-19  0.04 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.18 
20-29 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.40 
30-39 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 
40-45 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38 
Urban 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.31 0.46 
White 0.86 0.35 0.94 0.23 0.88 0.32 
Catholic 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 
Education 
Elementary school 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.31 0.07 0.30 
Less than high school 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 
High school 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Less than college 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 
College or more 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 
The table presents sample statistics for never-funded, funded, and eventually-funded PSUs from 
the National Fertility Study (1970) estimation sample.  Never-funded observations come from 
PSUs that never received federal family planning grants, eventually-funded observations come 
from PSUs that had not yet received funding by 1970, but would by 1973, and funded 
observations come from PSUs that had received funding by 1970. The sample statistics are 
weighted using the study’s sampling weights.  
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Table 4.2 The effect of family planning funding on Pap smear use in the previous year 
(1) (2) 
Funded Before 1970 0.056*** 0.083*** 
(0.012) (0.017) 
Urban 0.022* 0.049*** 
(0.013) (0.015) 
White 0.056*** 0.078*** 
(0.018) (0.019) 
Catholic 0.008 0.006 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Aged 15-19 -0.012 -0.004 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Aged 30-39 -0.085*** -0.077*** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Aged 40-55 -0.168*** -0.163*** 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Elementary school 0.090*** 0.094*** 
(0.024) (0.025) 
High school 0.177*** 0.172*** 
(0.023) (0.024) 
Some college 0.220*** 0.219*** 
(0.026) (0.027) 
College or more 0.250*** 0.235*** 
(0.027) (0.029) 
Constant 0.503*** 0.462*** 
(0.028) (0.031) 
Observations 6,676 6,476 
R-squared 0.052 0.066 
State Fixed Effects N Y 
Percent Change 0.083 0.122 
The table displays estimates of the effect of living in a county that received funding before 1970 
on the likelihood of receiving a Pap smear in the previous 12 months using the 1970 National 
Fertility Survey.  All regressions include an indicator for whether the woman lived in a county 
(primary sampling unit) that received funding before 1970 and an indicator for whether the 
primary sampling unit was urban as well as controls for race, age, catholic religion, education, 
and children ever born at the time of the survey.  All estimates are weighted using nationally-
representative population weights and clustered at the primary sampling unit level.   *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
Percentage change displays the effect as a percentage of the average for each dependent variable 
in 1970
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Table 4.3 The age-specific effects of family planning funding on Pap smear use in the 
previous year 
(1) (2) 
Funded Before 1970 0.058*** 0.092*** 
[0.017] [0.021] 
Funded Before 1970 X 10-19 -0.023 -0.043 
[0.060] [0.061] 
Funded Before 1970 X 30-39 -0.006 -0.019 
[0.024] [0.025] 
Funded Before 1970 X 40-55 0.006 -0.004 
[0.034] [0.034] 
Constant 0.503*** 0.457*** 
[0.030] [0.032] 
Observations 6676 6476 
R-squared 0.050 0.066 
State Fixed Effects N Y 
Percentage Change 
Age 10-19 0.052 0.073 
Age 20-29 0.085 0.14 
Age 30-39 0.077 0.11 
Age 40-55 0.094 0.13 
Test Funded Before 1970 | Age Category = 0 
Age 10-19 0.55 0.42 
Age 30-39 0.032 0.0060 
Age 40-55 0.041 0.0042 
The table displays age-specific estimates of the effect of living in a county that received funding 
before 1970 on the likelihood of receiving a Pap smear in the previous 12 months using the 1970 
National Fertility Survey.  The omitted age category in women aged 20-29.  All regressions 
include an indicator for whether the woman lived in a primary sampling unit that received 
funding before 1970 and an indicator for whether the primary sampling unit was urban as well as 
controls for race, age, catholic religion, education, and children ever born at the time of the 
survey.  All estimates are weighted using nationally-representative population weights and 
clustered at the primary sampling unit level.   *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  Percentage change displays the effect as a 
percentage of the average for each dependent variable in 1970. 
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Table 4.4 The effect of family planning funding on channels of Human Papilloma Virus 
transmission 
 Frequency of Sex  Recent Condom Use 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Funded Before 1970 0.26 0.20 -0.0126 -0.014 
[0.22] [0.31] [0.010] [0.013] 
Urban 0.425* 0.282 -0.024** -0.026** 
(0.234) (0.283) (0.010) (0.011) 
White 0.769** 0.828** 0.051*** 0.048*** 
(0.318) (0.335) (0.010) (0.011) 
Catholic -0.59*** -0.63*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
(0.225) (0.243) (0.010) (0.011) 
Aged 15-19 1.56* 1.44* -0.05*** -0.04*** 
(0.855) (0.868) (0.015) (0.016) 
Aged 30-39 -1.90*** -1.87*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 
(0.245) (0.252) (0.011) (0.010) 
Aged 40-55 -3.72*** -3.68*** 0.067*** 0.063*** 
(0.249) (0.253) (0.014) (0.013) 
Elementary school 0.243 0.275 0.027* 0.021 
(0.473) (0.485) (0.014) (0.015) 
High school 0.963** 0.894* 0.097*** 0.084*** 
(0.451) (0.458) (0.013) (0.014) 
Some college 1.010** 0.901* 0.120*** 0.114*** 
(0.483) (0.493) (0.018) (0.017) 
College or more 0.955* 0.902* 0.145*** 0.132*** 
(0.516) (0.526) (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 8.13*** 8.21*** 0.014 0.0277 
[0.49] [0.55] [0.016] [0.018] 
Observations 5516 5354 6720 6519 
R-squared 0.044 0.050 0.030 0.048 
State Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
The table displays estimates of the effect of living in a primary sampling unit that received 
funding before 1970 on the number of times the woman reported having had sexual intercourse 
in the previous four weeks (columns 1 and 2) and having used a condom since her last pregnancy 
(or first intercourse if she had no children) (columns 3 and 4) using the 1970 National Fertility 
Survey.   All regressions include an indicator for whether the woman lived in a primary sampling 
unit that received funding before 1970 and an indicator for whether the primary sampling unit 
was urban.  All regressions include controls for race, age, catholic religion, education and 
children ever born at the time of the survey.  All estimates are weighted using nationally-
representative population weights and clustered at the primary sampling unit level.   *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
Percentage change displays the effect as a percentage of the average for each dependent variable 
in 1970.  
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Table 4.5 Pooled estimates of the effect of family planning funding on age-adjusted cervical 
cancer mortality 
(1) (2) 
      
Periods -5 to -1 0.29 0.08 
[0.34] [0.35] 
Periods 1 to 5 0.16 0.152 
[0.36] [0.37] 
Periods 6 to 10 0.02 0.179 
[0.36] [0.37] 
Periods 11 to 15 -0.23 0.0847 
[0.34] [0.35] 
Constant 9.09*** 2.527 
[0.24] [5.2] 
Observations 91,950 91,080 
R-squared 0.048 0.068 
County and Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
State-by-year Fixed Effects N Y 
County Trends N Y 
The table displays the point estimates from an event study with dummies equal to five-year 
periods.  The omitted category is the year before funding was granted.  Estimates in column 1 
include county and year fixed effects, and column 2 adds state-by-year fixed effects and controls.  
Both models are weighted by county population.  The sample includes 19,620 county-year 
observations from all counties.  Age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality rates come from the 
1959-1988 multiple cause mortality files and are adjusted to the 1960 age distribution using the 
1960 census.  *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level.  All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the county level
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Table 4.6 Pooled estimates of the effect of family planning center funding on age-adjusted 
cervical cancer incidence 
  (1) (2) 
Periods -5 to -1 -0.3 -0.2 
[2.0] [1.9] 
Periods 1 to 5 -1.1 -1.3 
[2.2] [2.3] 
Periods 6 to 10 0.7 0 
[2.0] [2.6] 
Constant 19.3*** 23 
[1.5] [45] 
Observations 240 240 
R-squared 0.44 0.47 
County and Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
County Trends N Y 
The table displays the point estimates from an event study with dummies equal to five-year 
periods.  The omitted category is the year before funding was granted.  Estimates in column 1 
include county and year fixed effects and column 2 adds controls.  The sample includes 248 
county-year observations from all 8 counties in Connecticut.  Incidence is adjusted to the 1960 
age distribution using the 1960 census.  All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered at the county level.  *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level and * at the 10% level.   
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Appendix 
Calculation of treatment on the treated   
The parameters estimated in this paper provide intent-to-treat effects of federal family 
planning funding on Pap smear use and cervical cancer mortality.  I convert these estimates to 
treatment-on-the-treated effects in order to compare them to other studies.  Using the estimated 
change in screening as a result of funding in column two of Table 4.2 (0.083) and the average 
Pap smear screening rate in never-funded PSUs (0.66), I calculate that funding led to a 13 
percent increase in screening.  Using the lower 95 percent confidence interval on the estimate of 
the effect of family planning funding on cervical cancer mortality 5-10 years after funding from 
column two of table 3.5 (0.179, s.e.=0.37) and the average age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality 
rate over the estimation sample (6 deaths per 100,000 women), I find that family planning 
funding led to a nine percent decrease in age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality after 10 years.  
Dividing these two numbers gives the change in mortality given a one percent change in 
screening and an estimate of the treatment-on-the-treated.  It is -72 percent.   
 I compare my treatment-on-the-treated effect to similarly calculated estimates using the 
results from (Johannesson, Geirsson, and Day 1978).  They present rates of ever having received 
screening for each 10-year age cohort for each year between 1964 and 1974 and information on 
the age distribution of Icelandic women for each observation in the study period.  Using these 
data, I calculate an age-adjusted screening rate for each time period and then calculate the 
percentage difference in Pap smear ever-use between 1964 (44%) and 1974 (77%).  Using the 
five-year average mortality statistics provided in Johannesson, Geirsson, and Day (1978), I 
calculate the percentage change in age-adjusted cervical cancer mortality between the 1965-1970 
period (26.5 deaths per 100,000 women) and the 1971-1975 period (12.2 deaths per 100,000 
women).  Dividing these two numbers gives the change in age-adjusted mortality given a one 
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percent change in the ever-screening rate and an estimate of the treatment-on-the-treated.  It is 
also -72 percent.    
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation presents evaluations of three pre-ACA policies resembling ACA 
reforms.   
In the first chapter, I use variation across states and over time in state health insurance 
regulations and health insurance tax subsidies to show that the effect of a tax subsidy similar to 
the ACA’s tax credits depends on the type on regulations that affect underwriting.  I show that 
people with pre-existing conditions do not respond to tax subsidies in places where they cannot 
buy health insurance, but that they respond disproportionately in places where they can buy risk-
rated health insurance.  Most importantly for the ACA, in states in which people with pre-
existing conditions face the same premium as healthy people, tax subsidies have no effect on 
either group.    
The first chapter contains four policy-relevant findings.  First, I show that job-lock affects 
self-employment for people with pre-existing conditions.  Policymakers have consistently 
referred to people with pre-existing conditions as the quintessential case for job lock, yet little 
work explores the effect of high-cost medical conditions on employment outcomes.  Second, I 
provide evidence that the benefits of two decades of increased generosity in the tax code towards 
health insurance for the self-employed accrued unevenly across health status and geography.  
While people with high-risk health conditions benefited disproportionately in the majority of 
states, they did not benefit at all in states in which they were mostly likely to be denied health 
insurance.  Third, I show that tax subsidies and non-group market regulations interact.  This 
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provides support for the ACA’s two-pronged approach (tax subsidies and non-group market 
reforms) and casts doubt on recent proposals to repeal parts of the ACA or replace the ACA with 
tax-based subsidies alone.  Additionally, it illustrates the importance of accounting for both types 
of policies in future evaluations of the ACA on self-employment.  Fourth, the results of this 
paper suggest that the ACA’s tax subsidies might not have an effect on self-employment, 
contrary to predictions by researchers and policymakers.  The ACA’s non-group market reforms 
establish community rating and guaranteed issue, and prohibit elimination riders and therefore, 
look most similar to community-rated states.  Note that, while these results show that tax 
subsidies do not have an effect on self-employment in community rated states, my results do not 
imply that community rating and guaranteed issue will not have a direct effect on self-
employment.  
In the second chapter, I use the introduction of a minimum medical loss ratio rule in 
Michigan to show that a minimum MLR rule results in at least a six percentage point decrease in 
MLRs among for-profit commercial insurers.  The reduction in commercial medical loss ratios 
was driven by a disproportionate reduction in benefit payments.  The findings of this paper 
suggest that the establishment of a minimum MLR rule can result in unintended consequences.  
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature on the minimum MLR rule.  It is 
the first to use an individual state’s minimum MLR rule to evaluate the effect of such a policy.  
Although over 30 states had such rules at the time of the passage of the ACA, the effect of this 
type of rule on state insurance markets had never been estimated.  I am also the first to use 
regulatory differences between states as a control group.  This paper demonstrates the 
importance of a control group.  Without a control group, I would have concluded that Michigan’s 
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minimum MLR rule resulted in higher MLRs.  Finally, the paper is the first to present a 
conceptual framework illustrating possible perverse incentives of minimum MLR rules.  
In the third chapter I use quasi-experimental variation in the availability of subsidized 
pap smears to estimate the effect of this screening test on cervical cancer mortality. Although I 
find a large (8-13%) increase in the likelihood of receiving a Pap smear in the last year, event 
study point estimates suggest little correlation between screening and mortality.  However, my 
estimates are imprecise so I cannot rule-out existing estimates of the Pap smear’s effect on 
cervical cancer mortality.  Even though the results using a natural experiment in Pap smear 
availability are inconclusive, the time-series evidence suggests that much of the 80 percent 
reduction in cervical cancer over the 20th century had already occurred by the time Pap smears 
were used with sufficient frequency to substantially reduce cervical cancer.      
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